Preventing emerging infectious diseases: a strategy for the 21st century by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
PREVENTING
EMERGING
INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
A Strategy
for the
21st
Century
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
Public Health Service
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, Georgia
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
Jeffrey P. Koplan, M.D., M.P.H., Director
National Center for Infectious Diseases
James M. Hughes, M.D., Director
The following CDC staff members prepared this report.
National Center for Infectious Diseases
Sue Binder, M.D.
Alexandra M. Levitt, Ph.D.
Cover background: Electron micrograph of avian influenza virus (H5N1), a newly
discovered and virulent strain of influenza that infected humans
in Hong Kong in 1997.
in collaboration with
National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention
Helene D. Gayle, M.D., Director
National Immunization Program
Walter A. Orenstein, M.D., Director
in consultation with
Epidemiology Program Office
Barbara R. Holloway, M.P.H., Acting Director
National Center for Chronic Disease
Prevention and Health Promotion
James S. Marks, M.D., M.P.H., Director
National Center for Health Statistics
Edward J. Sondik, Ph.D., Director
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Linda Rosenstock, M.D., M.P.H., Director
and the
National Center for Infectious Diseases Plan Steering Committee
Judith R. Aguilar
David M. Bell, M.D.
Martin S. Cetron M.D.
Mary E. Chamberland, M.D.
Mark L. Eberhard, Ph.D.
Duane J. Gubler, Sc.D.
Meredith A. Hickson, M.P.H.
Jonathan E. Kaplan, M.D.
Rima F. Khabbaz, M.D.
James W. LeDuc, Ph.D.
Susan A. Maloney, M.D.
William J. Martin, Ph.D.
Alison C. Mawle, Ph.D.
Patrick McConnon, M.P.H.
Martin I. Meltzer, Ph.D.
Siobhán O’Connor, M.D.
Alan J. Parkinson, Ph.D.
Anne Schuchat, M.D.
Steven L.  Solomon, M.D.
Robert V. Tauxe, M.D.
Fred C. Tenover, Ph.D.
Theodore F. Tsai, M.D.
Robert B. Wainwright, M.D.
Office of the Associate Director for Minority Health
Walter W. Williams, M.D., M.P.H., Director
Office of Global Health
Stephen B. Blount, M.D., M.P.H., Director
Office of Women’s Health
Karen K. Steinberg, Ph.D, Acting Director
Public Health Practice Program Office
Edward L. Baker, M.D., M.P.H., Director
Executive Summary i
Preventing Emerging
Infectious Diseases
A Strategy for the 21st Century
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, Georgia
October 1998
Executive Summary iii
Preface v
Executive Summary vii
Introduction 1
Background 3
The “End” of Infectious Diseases 3
A New Consensus: The Institute of Medicine Report 3
CDC’s Response 4
The Second Phase of CDC’s Strategy 6
CDC’s Role 7
CDC Components Involved with Infectious Diseases 7
Partnerships 7
Goals for Preventing Emerging Infectious Diseases: 8
Target Areas 8
Summary of the Goals and Objectives 14
CDC’s Plan: Preventing Emerging Infectious Diseases:
    A Strategy for the 21st Century 15
Goal I: Surveillance and Response 17
Goal II: Applied Research 27
Goal III: Infrastructure and Training 35
Goal IV: Prevention and Control 42
Anticipated Outcomes 51
Appendix: Implementation of High Priorities from Addressing Emerging
Infectious Disease Threats: A Prevention Strategy for the United States
1994–1997 53
Acknowledgments 59
References 60
List of Boxes 65
Acronyms 67
Index 69
T A B L E   O F   C O N T E N T S
Executive Summary v
In 1994, CDC launched the first phase of anationwide effort to revitalize national capac-ity to protect the public from infectious diseases.
The effort focused on four goals: improving dis-
ease surveillance and outbreak response; support-
ing research to understand and combat emerging
infectious threats; preventing infectious diseases by
implementing disease control programs and com-
municating public health information; and rebuild-
ing the infectious disease-control component of the
public health infrastructure.
As a nation, we have made progress in all four
areas. The first line of defense for public health—
our network of state and local health depart-
ments—has been strengthened, and as a nation we
have become better prepared to address new
diseases as they arise. We have developed new tools
for detecting and  controlling infectious diseases.
New programmatic efforts have incorporated the
latest theories and techniques to help people change
behaviors that favor the spread of infectious dis-
eases. These achievements were made possible by
the hard work and dedication of colleagues in lo-
cal, state, and federal government; in universities;
in private industry; and in many nongovernmental
organizations and professional societies. CDC has
also begun to address emerging disease issues at
the global level, working in partnership with for-
eign governments, the World Health Organization,
and other organizations and agencies.
At the same time, however, we have witnessed
the appearance of new and unforeseen disease
threats, such as a virulent strain of avian influenza
that attacks humans, a human variant of “mad cow
disease,” and new drug-resistant forms of Staphy-
lococcus aureus. The emergence of these threats
reminds us that we must not become complacent.
We must never underestimate the power, destruc-
tiveness, and endless adaptability of infectious mi-
crobes.
As we face the new millennium, we must renew
our commitment to the prevention and control of
infectious diseases, recognizing that the battle
between humans and microbes will continue long
past our lifetimes and those of our children.
This document, Preventing Emerging Infectious
Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century, describes
CDC’s plan to combat infectious diseases over the
next 5 years. We look forward to working with
our many partners throughout the nation and the
world as we implement this plan.
Jeffrey P. Koplan, M.D., M.P.H.
Director
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
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Infectious diseases are a continuing menace to all
people, regardless of age, gender, lifestyle, ethnic
background, and socioeconomic status. They cause
suffering and death, and impose an enormous fi-
nancial burden on society. Although some diseases
have been conquered by modern advances, such
as antibiotics and vaccines, new ones are constantly
emerging (such as AIDS, Lyme disease, and hanta-
virus pulmonary syndrome), while others reemerge
in drug-resistant forms (such as malaria, tubercu-
losis, and bacterial pneumonias).
Because we do not know what new diseases will
arise, we must always be prepared for the unex-
pected. For example, in 1997, an avian strain of
influenza that had never before attacked humans
began to kill previously healthy people in Hong
Kong. This crisis raised the specter of an influenza
pandemic similar to the one that killed 20 million
people in 1918. Also in 1997, strains of Staphylo-
coccus aureus with diminished susceptibility to
vancomycin were reported in Japan and the United
States. If we are unable to replace drugs like van-
comycin as they lose their effectiveness—and to
limit the emergence and spread of resistance—some
diseases may become untreatable, as they were in
the preantibiotic era. In addition, the recent dis-
covery that a strain of the virus that causes HIV/
AIDS has been circulating at least since 19591 il-
lustrates the furtive way in which emerging infec-
tious agents can insinuate themselves into human
populations and remain undetected for years be-
fore emerging explosively as public health prob-
lems. Each of these examples reminds us that we
are barely one step ahead of the microbes and un-
derscores our need for a strong and vigilant public
health system.
Pathogenic microbes can be resilient, dangerous foes. Although it is impossible to predict their
individual emergence in time and place, we can be confident that new microbial diseases will
emerge.
—Institute of Medicine, Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health, 1992
CDC’S PLAN: PREVENTING EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES
This plan has been prepared under the leadership
of CDC’s National Center for Infectious Diseases
(NCID) with significant input from other major
CDC programs and centers involved in addressing
emerging infectious disease issues. These include
the National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Preven-
tion (NCHSTP) and the National Immunization
Program (NIP). Other parts of CDC that support
infectious disease prevention and control include
CDC’s Office of Global Health (OGH), Epidemi-
ology Program Office (EPO), Public Health Prac-
tice Program Office (PHPPO), and the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH). In addition, CDC has worked with many
experts and institutions throughout the United
States and abroad to develop this plan.
The fulfillment of CDC’s vision will require the
sustained and coordinated efforts of many individu-
als and organizations. As CDC carries out this plan,
it will coordinate with state and local health
departments (e.g., on surveillance of infectious
diseases), academic centers and other federal agen-
cies (e.g., on research agendas), health care pro-
viders and health care networks (e.g., on develop-
ment and dissemination of guidelines), international
organizations (e.g., on outbreak responses over-
seas), and other partners.
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GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR
PREVENTING EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
Because Preventing Emerging Infectious Diseases
is a sequel to CDC’s 1994 plan, its objectives and
activities are organized under the same four goals
described in the first plan, although in a different
order. The goals are Surveillance and Response,
Applied Research, Infrastructure and Training, and
Prevention and Control.
Public health surveillance is the ongoing, system-
atic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemi-
nation of health data, including information on
clinical diagnoses, laboratory-based diagnoses, spe-
cific syndromes, health-related behaviors, and other
indicators related to health outcomes. Epidemiolo-
gists use these data to detect outbreaks; character-
ize disease transmission patterns by time, place, and
person; evaluate prevention and control programs;
and project future health care needs. For Goal I:
Surveillance and Response, the objectives call for
strengthening infectious disease surveillance and
response in the United States and internationally,
as well as improving methods for gathering and
evaluating surveillance data. They also emphasize
that surveillance data are critical not only for de-
tecting outbreaks, but also for improving public
health practice and medical treatment.
Research is essential for understanding emerg-
ing infectious diseases and how to prevent and con-
trol them. For Goal II: Applied Research, the ob-
jectives include improving tools for identifying and
understanding emerging infectious diseases; deter-
mining risk factors for infectious diseases, as well
as infectious risk factors for chronic diseases; and
conducting research to develop and evaluate pre-
vention and control strategies.
The public health infrastructure is the underly-
ing foundation that supports the planning, deliv-
ery, and evaluation of public health activities and
practices. For Goal III: Infrastructure and Train-
ing, the objectives and activities focus on enhanc-
ing epidemiologic and laboratory capacity in the
United States and internationally. In the United
States, this requires improving CDC’s ability to
communicate electronically with its partners and
strengthening CDC’s capacity to serve as a refer-
ence center for diagnosis of infectious diseases and
drug-resistance testing. The objectives and activi-
ties also address the need to enhance the nation’s
capacity to respond to outbreaks, including those
caused by bioterrorism, and to provide training op-
portunities to ensure that today’s workers and fu-
ture generations are able to respond to emerging
threats.
All of CDC’s efforts are ultimately directed at
the implementation of Goal IV: Prevention and
Control. CDC will work with many partners (in-
cluding other government agencies, professional
societies, private industry, nongovernmental orga-
nizations, and managed care organizations) to
implement, support, and evaluate disease preven-
tion in the United States and internationally. As
part of this effort, CDC will conduct demonstra-
tion programs and will develop, evaluate, and pro-
mote strategies that help health care providers and
other individuals change behaviors that facilitate
disease transmission.
Target Areas
Preventing Emerging Infectious Diseases targets
certain categories of emerging infectious disease
problems and particular groups of people who are
at special risk. Collectively, these cause great suf-
fering and represent a tremendous burden on soci-
ety. Addressing infectious disease issues in these
target areas will be a high priority during the imple-
mentation of this plan.
Antimicrobial Resistance. The emergence of drug
resistance in bacteria, parasites, viruses, and fungi
is swiftly reversing advances of the previous 50
years. As we approach the 21st century, many im-
portant drug choices for the treatment of common
infections are becoming increasingly limited and
expensive and, in some cases, nonexistent.
Foodborne and Waterborne Diseases. Changes in
food processing and distribution are resulting in
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more multistate outbreaks of foodborne infections.
In addition, a new group of waterborne pathogens
has emerged that is unaffected by routine disinfec-
tion methods.
Vectorborne and Zoonotic Diseases. Many emerg-
ing or reemerging diseases are acquired from ani-
mals or are transmitted by arthropods. Environ-
mental changes can affect the incidence of these
diseases by altering the habitats of disease vectors.
Diseases Transmitted Through Blood Transfusions
or Blood Products. Improvements in donor screen-
ing, serologic testing, and transfusion practices have
made the U.S. supply one of the safest in the world,
despite its size and complexity. However, because
blood is a human tissue, it is a natural vehicle for
transmission of infectious agents. Therefore, con-
tinued vigilance is needed to ensure the safety of
the U.S. blood supply.
Chronic Diseases Caused by Infectious Agents.
Several chronic diseases once attributed to lifestyle
or environmental factors (such as some forms of
cancer, heart disease, and ulcers) might be caused
by or intensified by infectious agents. This new
knowledge raises the possibility that certain chronic
diseases may someday be treated with antimicro-
bial drugs or prevented by vaccines.
Vaccine Development and Use. Childhood diseases
such as diphtheria, tetanus, polio, measles, mumps,
rubella, and Haemophilus influenzae type b men-
ingitis have been virtually eliminated in the United
States through universal vaccination. However,
additional vaccines are needed to prevent diseases
that represent a great societal burden in the United
States or internationally, such as HIV/AIDS, den-
gue fever, hepatitis C, and malaria.
Diseases of People with Impaired Host Defenses.
People whose normal host defenses against infec-
tion have been impaired by illness or medical treat-
ment or as a result of age are more likely to be-
come ill with a variety of infectious diseases.
Infections that occur with increased frequency or
severity in such people are often called opportunis-
tic infections (OIs). Health care providers and sci-
entists must be ready to identify and investigate
each new OI as it appears, and to learn how to
diagnose, treat, control, and prevent it.
Diseases of Pregnant Women and Newborns.
Asymptomatic infections in a pregnant woman can
increase an infant’s risk of prematurity, low
birthweight, long-term disability, or death. In ad-
dition, infections may be silently transmitted from
mother to child during pregnancy, delivery, or
breast feeding. Effective and accessible prenatal care
is essential to the prevention of infection in preg-
nant women and newborn babies.
Diseases of Travelers, Immigrants, and Refugees.
People who cross international boundaries—such
as tourists, workers, immigrants, and refugees—
may be at increased risk of contracting infectious
diseases and may also disseminate diseases to new
places. International air travel has increased sub-
stantially in recent years, and more travelers are
visiting remote locations where they may be ex-
posed to infectious agents that are uncommon in
their native countries.
ANTICIPATED OUTCOMES
Achievement of the objectives described in this plan
will improve our ability to understand, detect, con-
trol, and prevent infectious diseases. The outcome
will be a stronger, more flexible U.S. public health
infrastructure well-prepared to respond to well-
known disease problems and to address the unex-
pected, whether it is an influenza pandemic, a dis-
ease caused by an unknown organism, or a
bioterrorist attack.
Implementation of this plan will produce the fol-
lowing results:
• A nationwide network for surveillance and re-
sponse will ensure the prompt identification of
emerging infectious diseases. State and local
health departments will have the equipment and
trained personnel needed to serve as the front
line public health response to infectious disease
threats.
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• Intensive population-based surveillance and re-
search programs in at least 10 areas of the United
States will generate data to identify new threats
to public health and help guide responses to
emerging infectious diseases.
• Health departments will rapidly detect and in-
vestigate outbreaks of foodborne illnesses using
sophisticated epidemiologic and laboratory tech-
niques. Early detection will facilitate rapid imple-
mentation of control measures and the preven-
tion of illness and death.
• Countries in all regions of the world will par-
ticipate in a global system for surveillance and
response that includes surveillance for infectious
agents that are resistant to antimicrobial drugs.
This effort will be undertaken in partnership with
the World Health Organization and other orga-
nizations and agencies around the world.
• Enhancement of the public health infrastructure
will help prepare the United States to respond
to bioterrorist incidents.
• Improved diagnostic testing methods will be
developed for new, reemerging, and drug-resis-
tant pathogens.
• A better understanding of risk factors for the
development of infection and disease will pro-
vide new opportunities for disease prevention.
• A better understanding of relationships between
infectious agents and some chronic diseases will
lead to new strategies for preventing and treat-
ing chronic diseases.
• New strategies will be designed to reduce insect
vector populations and control animal popula-
tions that serve as reservoirs for human diseases.
• Diagnostic and reference reagents will be avail-
able for use by public health laboratories. CDC
will have enhanced capacity to serve as the na-
tional reference center for diagnosis of infectious
diseases and for drug-resistance testing.
• The next generation of epidemiologists and
laboratorians will be trained and prepared to re-
spond to emerging infectious disease threats.
• Implementation of prevention guidelines will
result in decreased death and disability due to
nosocomial infections, opportunistic infections,
antimicrobial resistance, and infections in new-
borns.
• Cooperative efforts among managed care organ-
izations, health care facilities, state and local
health departments, and CDC will improve treat-
ment and prevention of infectious diseases.
• Deaths from vaccine-preventable diseases will be
significantly reduced in the United States and
abroad.
• Community-based demonstration programs will
help identify cost-effective approaches to ad-
dressing emerging infectious disease problems.
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Infectious diseases are a continuing menace toall people, regardless of age, gender, lifestyle,ethnic background, and socioeconomic status
(see Box 1). They cause suffering and death and
impose an enormous financial burden on society
(see Box 2). Although some diseases have been con-
quered by modern advances, such as antibiotics and
vaccines, new ones are constantly emerging (such
as HIV/AIDS, Legionnaires’ disease, Lyme disease,
and hantavirus pulmonary syndrome), while oth-
ers reemerge in drug-resistant forms (such as ma-
laria, tuberculosis, and bacterial pneumonias).
Because we do not know what new diseases will
arise, we must always be prepared for the unex-
pected. For example, in 1997, an avian strain of
influenza that had never before attacked humans
began to kill previously healthy people in Hong
Kong. This crisis raised the specter of an influenza
I N T R O D U C T I O N
pandemic similar to the one that killed 20 million
people in 1918. Also in 1997, strains of Staphylo-
coccus aureus with diminished susceptibility to van-
comycin were reported in Japan and the United
States. If we are unable to replace drugs like van-
comycin as they lose their effectiveness—and to
limit the emergence and spread of resistance—some
diseases may become untreatable, as they were in
the preantibiotic era. In addition, the recent dis-
covery that a strain of the virus that causes HIV/AIDS
has been circulating at least since 19591 illustrates
the furtive way in which emerging infectious agents
can insinuate themselves into human populations
and remain undetected for years before emerging
explosively as public health problems. Each of these
examples reminds us that we are barely one step
ahead of the microbes and underscores our need
for a strong and vigilant public health system.
Box 1    Trends in Deaths Caused by Infectious Diseases in the United States, 1900–1994
Infectious disease mortality in the
United States decreased markedly
during most of the 20th century.
However, between 1980 and 1992,
the death rate from infectious
diseases increased 58% (including
only those people for whom the
primary cause of death was an
infectious disease).2  The sharp
increase in infectious disease deaths
in 1918 and 1919 was caused by the
influenza pandemic, which killed
more than 20 million people world-
wide and over 500,000 people in
the United States.3 This episode
illustrates the volatility of infectious
disease death rates.
Source: National Center for Health
Statistics, CDC, Vital Statistics of
the United States, Mortality.
Washington, DC: Public Health Service.
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2 Preventing Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century
This document, Preventing Emerging Infectious
Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century, describes
a strategy for moving toward the fulfillment of
CDC’s vision of a world in which we join in a com-
mon effort to combat today’s emerging infectious
diseases and prevent those of tomorrow. It repre-
sents the second phase of the effort launched in
1994 with the publication of CDC’s  Addressing
Emerging Infectious Disease Threats: A Prevention
Strategy for the United States.4  This strategy was
developed in collaboration with experts and pro-
fessional organizations and societies throughout the
United States and abroad.
• The lifetime, discounted, direct* medical cost of
treating a person infected with HIV is estimated to be
$96,000.5, 6  The lifetime, discounted direct medical
costs of treating a child infected with HIV since birth
were estimated by one study to be about $161,0007;
a second study calculated a higher, but undiscounted,
figure of $408,000.8   None of these estimates
includes the financial impact of multidrug therapy with
protease inhibitors, which costs more than $10,000
per person per year and is now widely used.9
• When a patient on a medical ward acquires an
infection, treatment costs an average of $2,100 in
additional hospital charges (1992 dollars). Blood-
stream infections (bacteremia) cause the patient to
stay in the hospital an average of 7 additional days
and result in an average of $3,517 in additional
hospital charges per infected patient.10
• Recent outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis in several cities
in the United States have cost an average of $330 per
Box  2 Economic Costs for Patient Care from Infectious Diseases, United States
The direct and indirect costs of infectious diseases continue to be tremendous. The following are some examples of
the cost per case for several infectious diseases:
case-patient in direct medical costs and lost productiv-
ity. The most severe cases, which require hospitaliza-
tion, cost more than 10 times the average.11
• Most cases of Lyme disease that are diagnosed in the
early stages of the illness incur about $74 in direct
medical treatment costs. However, if diagnosis and
treatment do not occur in a timely manner, complica-
tions can result that cost from $2,228 to $6,724 per
patient in direct medical costs in the first year alone.12
• In the United States, human papillomaviruses (HPV)
are associated with 82% of the 15,000 cases and
4,600 deaths due to cervical cancer each year. They
are also associated with more than one million
precancerous lesions of varying severity.13–15  The
direct medical cost of treating a patient with cervical
cancer is $9,200 to $13,360, while surgery to remove
a precancerous lesion costs from $1,100 to $4,360.16
*Direct medical costs include physician and clinic staff charges, medications, devices and appliances, and diagnostic tests. Direct
nonmedical costs include transportation to health care facility and care provided by families. Indirect costs include lost wages and
time spent being ill or caring for ill persons, whereas intangible costs include apprehension, grief, pain, changes in social function-
ing, and psychological consequences.
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BACKGROUND
The “End” of Infectious Diseases
In the years following World War II, it was widely
believed that humans were winning the centuries-
long war against infectious microbes. Life-threat-
ening bacterial diseases such as tuberculosis and
typhoid fever could be treated by antibiotics.
Dreaded diseases of childhood such as polio,
whooping cough, and diphtheria could be con-
quered through vaccination. Coupled with earlier
improvements in urban sanitation and water qual-
ity, vaccines and antibiotics dramatically lowered
the incidence of infectious diseases. Thus, it became
possible to imagine a world in which infectious
pathogens would no longer prey upon humanity.
However, this optimism was premature. As early
as the 1950s, penicillin began to lose its power to
cure infections caused by Staphylococcus aureus,
a common bacterium that can cause serious illness.
In 1957 and 1968, new strains of influenza emerged
in China and spread rapidly around the globe, and
in the 1970s there was a resurgence of sexually
transmitted diseases. Also during the 1970s, sev-
eral new diseases were identified in the United States
and elsewhere, including Legionnaires’ disease,
Lyme disease, toxic shock syndrome, and Ebola
hemorrhagic fever. During the 1980s, as state and
local support for infectious disease surveillance de-
clined,17 our attitude of complacency towards in-
fectious disease threats was further shaken by the
appearance of acquired immunodeficiency syn-
drome (AIDS) and the reemergence of tuberculosis
(including multidrug-resistant strains), which
spread quickly through U.S. cities.
A New Consensus:
The Institute of Medicine Report
By the early 1990s, health experts no longer
believed that the threat of infectious diseases was
receding in the United States or elsewhere. Grow-
ing concern about the threat of emerging infectious
diseases was cogently expressed in a 1992 report
issued by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the
National Academy of Sciences. The report, Emerg-
ing Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the
United States, emphasized the intimate links be-
tween U.S. health and international health.18
It described the major factors that contribute to
disease emergence, including societal changes and
the ability of microbes to evolve and adapt (see
Box 3). It concluded that emerging infectious dis-
eases are a major threat to U.S. health, and it chal-
lenged the U.S. government to take action.
Box  3 What Are Emerging Infectious
Diseases and Why Are They
Emerging?
As defined in the 1992 Institute of Medicine report,
emerging infectious diseases include diseases
whose incidence in humans has increased within the
past two decades or threatens to increase in the near
future.18  Modern demographic and environmental
conditions that favor the spread of infectious
diseases include
• Global travel.
• Globalization of the food supply and centralized
processing of food.
• Population growth and increased urbanization and
crowding.
• Population movements due to civil wars, famines,
and other man-made or natural disasters.
• Irrigation, deforestation, and reforestation projects
that alter the habitats of disease-carrying insects
and animals.
• Human behaviors, such as intravenous drug use
and risky sexual behavior.
• Increased use of antimicrobial agents and
pesticides, hastening the development of
resistance.
• Increased human contact with tropical rain forests
and other wilderness habitats that are reservoirs
for insects and animals that harbor unknown
infectious agents.
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CDC’s Response
In 1994, CDC answered the challenge from the In-
stitute of Medicine by launching a national effort
to revitalize the U.S. capacity to protect the public
from infectious diseases. This effort was described
in Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease Threats:
A Prevention Strategy for the United States.4 As
funds became available, CDC implemented the
strategy incrementally, with the help of many part-
ners.
By fiscal year 1997, funds were available to
implement about one-third of the recommended
programs and activities, with a focus on improv-
ing surveillance, conducting applied research,
rebuilding the public health infrastructure, and en-
hancing prevention of emerging infectious diseases.
These activities were accomplished in partnership
with federal, state, and local agencies; universities;
private industry; foreign governments; the World
Health Organization (WHO); and many nongov-
ernmental organizations. Examples of the impact
of public health actions that address emerging in-
fectious disease threats are listed in Boxes 4 and 5.
The implementation of the 10 highest priority items
from Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease
Threats is described in the Appendix (see page 53).
Box  4 Examples of the Impact of Prevention Activities To Reduce Morbidity and
Mortality due to Emerging Infectious Diseases
In recent years, prevention efforts in the United States by CDC and other groups have led to
• Reduction in the number of nosocomial (health care-
associated) outbreaks of multidrug-resistant tuberculo-
sis from 9 between 1990 and 1993 to none in 1996
and 1997, due to the implementation of tuberculosis
control measures in hospitals.19
• Reduction in HIV/AIDS mortality by 23% from 1995 to
1996, associated with declines in the incidence of HIV/
AIDS-related opportunistic infections.20
• Reduction in cases of group B streptococcal disease
(GBS) by over 40% between 1993 and 199521  in
communities that implemented CDC’s GBS guide-
lines.22  The reduction in GBS cases was maintained
through 1997.23 (See also Box 20.)
• Reduction in cases of bacterial meningitis among
children under 5 years old by 87% between 1986 and
1995 due to vaccination against Haemophilus
influenzae type b, the leading cause of bacterial
meningitis in children.24
• Reduction in the incidence of hepatitis B infection by
more than 60% from 1985 to 1996, due in part to
changes in high risk behaviors and increased immuniza-
tion.25
• Reduction in the incidence of invasive listeriosis by
44% between 1989 and 1993, associated with
increased food industry efforts, aggressive food
monitoring policies, and the dissemination of dietary
guidelines to consumers at special risk (for example,
pregnant women, the elderly, and immunocompro-
mised people).26  The reduction in listeriosis cases was
maintained between 1993 and 1996. 23
• Reduction in the incidence of hepatitis C infection by
more than 80% from 1989 to 1996, due in part to
changes in high risk behaviors and improved screening
of the blood supply.27
Introduction 5
Box  5 Disasters Averted: Disease Control in Action
When public health efforts are successful, fewer cases of disease occur, and small outbreaks are stopped before they
can become large ones. Because it can be difficult to measure the absence of a problem, the success of disease
control programs can be difficult to assess. Here are examples of some potentially devastating outbreaks that were
controlled by rapid public health action.
Hepatitis C virus transmitted through a
contaminated medical product
In 1994, CDC assisted in the investigation of an
outbreak of hepatitis C virus that was transmitted
through contaminated immunoglobulin intravenously
administered to people with immunodeficiency disor-
ders. In collaboration with the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), CDC traced the infection to multiple lots
of immunoglobulin that were marketed by a single
manufacturer.28 The manufacturer rapidly issued a
voluntary worldwide recall of its intravenous immuno-
globulin preparations. The U.S. Public Health Service
subsequently issued recommendations for screening and
counseling patients who had received the contaminated
product. To prevent future outbreaks, FDA now requires
specific procedures to inactivate viruses in such products.
Escherichia coli O157:H7 transmitted by
hamburger meat
In 1997, the Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment detected a small cluster of cases of E. coli
O157:H7 infection using DNA fingerprinting techniques29
(see Boxes 26 and 27). Each of the ill people had eaten
the same brand of frozen hamburger patty. Twenty-five
million pounds of ground beef were recalled, and a
potential nationwide outbreak was averted.
Salmonella Agona transmitted by an internationally
distributed snack food
Between October 1994 and January 1995, Israeli health
officials noted an increased incidence of salmonellosis
caused by Salmonella Agona. In February 1995, British
officials reported a small outbreak of S. Agona infection
associated with eating a snack food manufactured in
Israel. Epidemiologic studies showed that the outbreaks
in Israel and the United Kingdom were related.30 Working
with state health departments, CDC identified 10 people
in the United States who had also become ill after eating
the suspect snack food, and FDA was able to culture S.
Agona from unopened packages. A food hazard warning
was issued, and the product was recalled in several
countries, resulting in the prevention of thousands of
potential cases of salmonellosis.
Ebola hemorrhagic fever virus transmitted by contact
with body fluids
An outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever killed 240 people
in and around the city of Kikwit in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (then Zaire) between January and August 1995
(see Box 44). Epidemiologic investigation indicated that
much of the ongoing transmission was occurring in
hospitals. The number of new cases dropped sharply after
CDC and its partners helped disinfect the hospitals and
supplied the staff members with protective clothing and
disposable syringes.31 In addition, aggressive case-finding
and prompt dissemination of health information to the local
population lessened disease spread outside of hospitals.
Hepatitis A virus transmitted by frozen
strawberries
An outbreak of hepatitis A among children in several U.S.
states in March and April 1997 was traced to the consump-
tion of frozen strawberries distributed through a USDA-
sponsored school lunch program. Working together, FDA,
CDC, USDA, and the health departments of the affected
states determined that the strawberries had been pro-
cessed and packed by a company in California, which
voluntarily recalled the implicated product lots.32  CDC
subsequently notified state health departments about the
possible benefits of administering immunoglobulin to
children who may have eaten contaminated strawberries.
Due to prompt attention by state and local health depart-
ments, CDC, and other federal agencies, the extent of the
outbreak was limited.
Tuberculosis in New York City
More than 3,800 cases of tuberculosis (TB) were reported
in New York City in 1992, the peak year of the recent
epidemic. Beginning that year, the New York City Depart-
ment of Health began a program of Directly Observed
Therapy (DOT) to ensure that all TB patients complete their
prescribed courses of antibiotic treatment. Since then,
cases have fallen steadily each year. In 1997, only 1,730
cases were reported. Moreover, between 1992 and 1997,
cases of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis decreased from
441 to 53. The New York City DOT program is considered
a model program by the World Health Organization.
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Box  6 Why Does CDC’s Emerging Infections Plan Need To Be Updated?
Several new developments have contributed to CDC’s decision to amend and update its emerging infectious diseases
plan, in addition to progress in implementing the highest priorities in the 1994 plan. These include
Emerging Threats
• A new variant of a fatal neurologic illness, Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease, in the United Kingdom, possibly
transmitted by ingestion of beef from animals afflicted
with “mad cow disease.”
• A new and virulent strain of influenza in Hong Kong.
• Staphylococcus aureus with reduced susceptibility to
vancomycin in the United States and Japan.
• A new strain of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, now
endemic in New York City and New York State.
Scientific Findings
• Evidence that many infectious microbes cause or
contribute to the development of some chronic
diseases.
• Discovery of many human genes that influence
susceptibility to infection, severity of infection, and
responsiveness to vaccination or treatment.33
• Further discoveries about what appears to be a new
type of transmissable agent, the prion, which appears
to be responsible for certain neurologic diseases,
including Creutzfeld-Jakob disease.34
Tools and Technologies
• Electronic communications linking public health
institutions in most areas of the world.
• Innovations in biotechnology that make it easier to
identify and track microbes.
Changes in Health Care Delivery
• Increased participation in managed care plans in the
United States, creating new opportunities and chal-
lenges for disease prevention, surveillance, control, and
research.
• Shortened hospital stays for some conditions, making it
necessary to develop ways to monitor patient out-
comes that appear after the patient has left the
hospital.
• Growth of home health care,35 requiring new public
health partnerships and new methods for assessing
the impact of treatments and measuring the occur-
rence of health care-related infections in home health
care settings.
Public and Policy Issues
• Books, films, and media reports about the dangers of
emerging infectious diseases, resulting in increased
public awareness.
• Government reports and commitments, such as the
1995 National Science and Technology Council report
(see Box 7),36 the 1996 Presidential Decision Directive
on Emerging Infectious Diseases,37 and the 1997
National Food Safety Initiative.38
THE SECOND PHASE OF CDC’S STRATEGY
The effort to rebuild U.S. capacity to combat infec-
tious diseases is well under way. However, the ful-
fillment of CDC’s vision of a safer world in the next
millennium requires a long-term commitment and
sustained effort. This document, Preventing Emerg-
ing Infectious Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Cen-
tury, describes the second phase of CDC’s strategy,
taking into account the new discoveries and chal-
lenges of the past 4 years and building on the expe-
rience, success, and knowledge gained from imple-
menting the 1994 plan (see Box 6).
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CDC’s Role
CDC—the nation’s prevention agency—is dedi-
cated to the prevention and control of disease and
the promotion of health. The agency grew out of
efforts to control malaria in the United States, and
today retains a critical role in addressing infectious
disease threats. CDC is known for
• Working with state health departments and oth-
ers to conduct surveillance to identify disease
problems.
• Responding rapidly to outbreaks of disease.
• Providing knowledge and tools for prevention.
• Combining its strengths in epidemiology and
laboratory sciences to solve problems that can-
not be solved by either discipline alone.
• Providing global assistance to prevent disease.
CDC Components Involved with
Infectious Diseases
This plan has been prepared under the leadership
of CDC’s National Center for Infectious Diseases
(NCID) with significant input from other major
CDC programs and centers involved in addressing
emerging infectious disease issues. These include
the National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Preven-
tion (NCHSTP) and the National Immunization
Program (NIP). NCHSTP is responsible for devel-
oping, assessing, and disseminating programs to
prevent and control HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
sexually transmitted diseases within the United
States and its territories. NCHSTP also plays a lead-
ership role in many international control efforts,
often working in collaboration with WHO, the U.S.
Agency for International Development, and other
global partners. The National Immunization Pro-
gram (NIP) provides leadership for immunization
activities at the federal, state, and local levels, and
collaborates with WHO, the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and other organizations
in the worldwide eradication of polio and other
international immunization programs. Other parts
of CDC that support infectious disease prevention
and control include CDC’s Office of Global Health
(OGH), Epidemiology Program Office (EPO), Pub-
lic Health Practice Program Office (PHPPO), and
National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH).
Partnerships
The fulfillment of CDC’s vision of a safer world
requires the sustained, coordinated, and comple-
mentary efforts of many individuals and organiza-
tions. For example, many U.S. agencies play
important roles in combating emerging infectious
diseases, often in cooperation with each other (see
Box 7). Other important players include private
citizens, health care providers, companies, and
laboratories. Examples of special contributions by
pharmaceutical companies include the donation by
Merck & Co. of ivermectin for worldwide treat-
Box  7 A  U.S. Government Task Force on
Emerging Infectious Diseases
In 1996 the Committee on International Science,
Engineering, and Technology (CISET) of the National
Science and Technology Council formed an Emerging
Infectious Disease Task Force charged with imple-
menting the recommendations of the 1995 CISET
policy report 36 and the provisions of the 1996
Presidential Decision Directive on Emerging Dis-
eases.37  The members of the Task Force, which is
chaired by CDC and the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy, also includes the
National Institutes of Health
Food and Drug Administration
U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Agriculture
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
Department of Commerce
National Aeronautics and Space Agency
U.S. Department of State
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ment of onchocerciasis (river blindness) and by
SmithKline Beecham of albendazole for worldwide
elimination of lymphatic filariasis (a major global
cause of disability from lymphedema and elephan-
tiasis). A nonprofit organization, Rotary Interna-
tional, has made major contributions to polio eradi-
cation efforts. As CDC carries out this plan, it will
coordinate with state and local health departments
(for example, on surveillance of infectious diseases),
academic centers and other federal agencies (for
example, on research agendas), health care provid-
ers and health care networks (for example, on de-
velopment and dissemination of guidelines), inter-
national organizations (for example, on outbreak
responses overseas), and many other partners.
Goals for Preventing Emerging Infectious
Diseases
Preventing Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Strat-
egy for the 21st Century describes steps that we
can take over the next 5 years to help create a world
in which people are better protected from infec-
tious diseases. Because this document is an update
of the 1994 plan, its activities are organized under
the same four goals described in the first plan:
Surveillance and Response, Applied Research,
Infrastructure and Training, and Prevention and
Control.
The four goals are interdependent. Surveillance
systems monitor emerging infectious pathogens and
outbreaks of disease. A response is mounted when
surveillance data or other information indicates a
change in the incidence or distribution of an infec-
tious disease, or when a new or variant strain of a
pathogen has become a health threat. Through
applied research, scientists answer questions about
the etiology, transmission, diagnosis, prevention,
and control of emerging infectious diseases. Re-
search, surveillance, and response all depend on
the public health infrastructure that supports,
trains, and equips public health workers, and links
them in national and global networks. Training the
next generation of public health scientists is a cru-
cial component of the public health infrastructure.
All of CDC’s efforts are ultimately directed at imple-
menting the fourth goal, prevention and control,
which receives increased emphasis in this plan. In
many instances, CDC acts as a catalyst, develop-
ing and evaluating prevention and control strate-
gies that can be implemented by others.
An outline of the goals and objectives in Pre-
venting Emerging Infectious Diseases appears on
page 14.
Target Areas
To accomplish these goals and objectives, Prevent-
ing Emerging Infectious Diseases targets certain
categories of emerging infectious disease problems
and particular groups of people who are at special
risk. Addressing infectious disease problems in these
target areas will be a high priority as we imple-
ment this plan.
Emerging Disease Issues
• Antimicrobial Resistance
• Foodborne and Waterborne Diseases
• Vectorborne and Zoonotic Diseases
• Diseases Transmitted Through Blood
Transfusions or Blood Products
• Chronic Diseases Caused by Infectious Agents
• Vaccine Development and Use
Populations of Special Concern
• People with Impaired Host Defenses
• Pregnant Women and Newborns
• Travelers, Immigrants, and Refugees
Antimicrobial Resistance. Antimicrobial drugs have
saved the lives of millions of people. However, the
emergence of drug resistance in bacteria, parasites,
viruses, and fungi is swiftly reversing miracles of
the previous 50 years. As we approach the 21st
century, many important drug choices for the treat-
ment of common infections are becoming increas-
ingly limited and expensive and, in some cases,
nonexistent.39 A 1995 U.S. government report es-
timated that the emergence of antimicrobial resis-
tance among six common bacteria in hospitals adds
approximately $661 million per year in hospital
charges.40 (This estimate is an underestimate
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because it does not include indirect costs, such as
costs of lost days of work.)
Foodborne and Waterborne Diseases. Each year,
millions of people get sick from foodborne diseases
in the United States and thousands die.41 Changes
in how food is processed and distributed have re-
sulted in more multistate outbreaks in the United
States (see Box 8). CDC is a major participant in
the National Food Safety Initiative, which was cre-
ated in 1997 to address food safety problems in
the United States.
Waterborne microbes are also an important
threat to the water supplies of many U.S. cities.42
A new group of pathogens has emerged that is un-
affected by routine disinfection. Of the waterborne
outbreaks reported to CDC during 1993 and 1994,
more than half of those for which a specific patho-
gen could be identified were caused by a chlorine-
resistant microbe.43
Vectorborne and Zoonotic Diseases. Many diseases
emerging or reemerging today are acquired from
animals (see Box 9) or are transmitted by
arthropods. Animal-borne pathogens are important
not only because of the illnesses they cause, but
also because new human diseases can arise from
animal reservoirs. For example, pandemic strains
of influenza can emerge from avian and swine res-
ervoirs,44 and many experts believe that HIV
evolved from a virus carried by a nonhuman pri-
mate. Changes in the environment—including cli-
mate changes and ecological changes due to engi-
neering projects like dam-building—can also have
profound effects on rates of vectorborne and
zoonotic diseases.
Box  8 Examples of Multistate Foodborne Outbreaks in the United States, 1994–1997
Number
Year Organism of States Food Source
1994 Shigella flexneri 2 Green onions, probably contaminated in Mexico.
1994 Listeria monocytogenes 3 Milk, contaminated after pasteurization and shipped interstate.
1995 Salmonella Enteriditis 41 Ice cream premix hauled in trucks that had previously carried raw
eggs.
1996 Cyclospora cayetanensis 20 Raspberries from Guatemala, mode of contamination unclear.
Cases  were also reported in the District of Columbia and two
Canadian provinces.
1996 Escherichia coli O157:H7 3 Unpasteurized apple juice, probably contaminated during harvest.
1996 Norwalk virus 5 Oysters, contaminated before harvest.
1997 Salmonella Infantis 2 Alfalfa sprouts, probably contaminated during sprouting.
1997 C. cayetanensis 18 Raspberries imported from Guatemala, mesclun lettuce, and
products containing basil. Cases were also reported in the District of
Columbia and two Canadian provinces.
1997 Hepatitis A 4 Strawberries from Mexico distributed through the USDA
Commodity Program for use in school lunches (see Box 5).
10 Preventing Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1980–1989
Bat
Dog/coyote
Acquired abroad
1990–1997
N
um
be
r 
of
 C
as
es
Box  9 Emergence of Bat-associated Rabies
in Humans in the United States
Diseases Transmitted Through Blood Transfusions
or Blood Products. Improvements in donor screen-
ing, serologic testing, and transfusion practices have
made the U.S. supply one of the safest in the world,
despite its size and complexity. However, because
blood is a human tissue, it is a natural vehicle for
transmission of infectious agents (see Box 10). Dur-
ing the 1980s, HIV was transmitted through clot-
ting factor and blood transfusions, and during the
1990s, hepatitis C virus was transmitted via intra-
venous immunoglobulin (see Box 5). Although re-
search on artificial blood substitutes is under way,
it is unlikely that they will be available in the near
future. Therefore,  continued vigilance is required
to ensure the safety of the U.S. blood supply.
Chronic Diseases Caused by Infectious Agents.
Several chronic diseases once attributed to lifestyle
or environmental factors (such as some forms of
cancer, diabetes, heart disease, and ulcers) are ac-
tually caused by or intensified by an infectious agent
(see Box 11). For example, the majority of peptic
ulcers—long thought to be due to stress and diet—
are now known to be caused by the bacterium
Helicobacter pylori, and recent data indicate that
Chlamydia pneumoniae infection may contribute
to coronary artery disease (see Box 29). Findings
like these raise the possibility that some chronic
conditions, including cancer and heart disease, may
someday be treated with antimicrobial drugs or
prevented by vaccines. Over the next 5 years, CDC
The number of cases of rabies diagnosed in humans in
the United States has increased significantly since
1990. Most of the increase is associated with rabies
strains found in bats, even though bats account for less
than 10% of the approximately 7,000–9,500 cases of
animal rabies reported in the United States each year.
Partly because most people who die from bat-
associated rabies have no history of a bat bite or a bite
from another animal, the disease is frequently misdiag-
nosed. Often, the correct diagnosis is not made until
after death, when an autopsy is performed. Although
nearly 40 different species of bats are found north of
Mexico, most human fatalities are due to variant rabies
viruses associated with a single bat species.45
Box 10 Bacterial Contamination of Blood and
Blood Products
Since 1985, there have been 21 reported episodes of
transfusion of red blood cell units contaminated with
the bacterial pathogen Yersinia enterocolitica, leading
to 12 deaths.46 Studies indicate that the rate of
contamination of blood products by other bacterial
pathogens also may be significant.47 In 1997, CDC
entered into a cooperative agreement with national
blood collection and distribution agencies to deter-
mine the frequency of transfusion reactions associ-
ated with bacterial contamination of blood products.
Currently, the nation’s blood supply is not routinely
screened for bacterial contamination. The new study
will be a critical step in addressing this issue and will
increase clinicians’ awareness of bacterial contamina-
tion as a cause of transfusion reactions.
Introduction 11
will play a major role in assessing new research find-
ings, encouraging and conducting further research
where needed, and disseminating information to
physicians and other health care providers.
Vaccine Development and Use. Childhood diseases
such as diphtheria, tetanus, polio, measles, mumps,
rubella, and Haemophilus influenzae type b men-
ingitis have been virtually eliminated in the United
States through universal vaccination.48 Moreover,
smallpox has been eradicated worldwide, and po-
lio may be globally eradicated by the year 2000.
However, although several new vaccines are cur-
rently undergoing clinical evaluation (for example,
against Lyme disease, rotavirus gastroenteritis, and
invasive pneumococcal disease), no effective vac-
cines exist for many other new or reemerging dis-
eases (for example, HIV/
AIDS, dengue, hepatitis
C, and malaria). CDC
and its partners are work-
ing to develop new vac-
cines and to evaluate
their immunogenicity, ef-
ficacy, and safety. In the
United States, increasing
vaccination rates in
adults (for example,
those at risk for compli-
cations of influenza or
pneumococcal pneumo-
nia)—as well as in chil-
dren—is a high priority
for CDC. In addition,
CDC participates in
implementation of pro-
grams to prevent and
control vaccine-prevent-
able diseases internation-
ally (see Box 34).
Box 11 Infectious Agents That Cause or Contribute to
Neoplastic Diseases in Humans
Epstein-Barr virus Nasopharyngeal carcinoma (undifferentiated)
Burkitt’s lymphoma
Posttransplant lymphoproliferative disease
B-cell lymphoma
Helicobacter pylori Gastric carcinoma
Mucosa-associated lymphoid tissue lymphoma
Hepatitis B virus Hepatocellular carcinoma
Hepatitis C virus Hepatocellular carcinoma
Human herpesvirus-8 Kaposi’s sarcoma
Human immunodeficiency virus Lymphoma
Human papillomavirus Cervical carcinoma
Human T-cell leukemia virus Adult T-cell leukemia
Liver flukes Cholangiocarcinoma
Schistosoma haematobium Bladder carcinoma
Diseases of People with Impaired Host Defenses.
People whose normal host defenses against infec-
tion have been impaired by illness or medical treat-
ment or as a result of age are more likely to be-
come ill with a variety of infectious diseases. Infec-
tions that occur with increased frequency or sever-
ity in such people are often called opportunistic
infections (OIs) (see Box 12). Over the past two
decades, the most significant emergence of OIs
worldwide has been in persons infected with HIV.
Other populations at risk include recipients of bone
marrow and solid organ transplants; patients
receiving chemotherapy, chronic corticosteroid
therapy, or other immunosuppressive drugs; pa-
tients suffering from burns and traumatic injuries;
diabetics; patients on renal dialysis; patients with
indwelling medical devices; newborn infants; and
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the elderly. Health care providers and scientists
must be ready to identify and investigate each new
OI as it appears and to learn how to diagnose, treat,
control, and prevent it.
Diseases of Pregnant Women and Newborns. When
a pregnant woman acquires an infection, the health
of both the woman and her fetus may be endan-
gered. Asymptomatic infections in a pregnant
woman can increase an infant’s risk of prematu-
rity, low birthweight, long-term disability, or death.
As this graph shows, the incidence of OIs is high when an HIV-infected adult becomes severely immunosup-
pressed (that is, has a CD4 lymphocyte count that is less than 200 cells/µL). Pneumocystis carinii and dissemi-
nated Mycobacterium avium complex infections are the most commonly diagnosed OIs in this population. Data
are from CDC’s Adult and Adolescent Spectrum of Disease Project, which consists of medical record reviews of
HIV-infected persons 13 years of age and older who receive care at more than 100 medical facilities in 11 cities in
the United States and Puerto Rico.
Source: CDC Adult and Adolescent Spectrum of Disease Project, 1992-1996.
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Box 12 Incidence of Opportunistic Infections (OIs) in HIV-Positive Adults with Depressed
CD4 Lymphocyte Counts
Some infections may be silently transmitted from
mother to child during pregnancy, delivery, or
breast feeding, causing illness or death. Adverse
outcomes from many of these infections can be pre-
vented by prenatal care. Unfortunately, access to,
and utilization of, prenatal care is low in some com-
munities. Because of limited access to care and other
factors, some racial and ethnic minorities experi-
ence high rates of maternal infections and related
complications (see Box 13).
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Box 13 Infectious Diseases and the Black-
White Mortality Gap
African Americans have higher rates of some
infectious diseases than other American ethnic
groups. Reasons for these higher rates are only
partially understood, but include differences in
access to care and lower average socioeconomic
status. During the early 1990s, African Americans
had an infectious disease death rate of 46 per
100,000, 36% higher than the rate for the popula-
tion as a whole.49 In the 1980s, African American
infants had the highest early and late neonatal
death rate due to infectious diseases of any group
(33.8 and 41.7 per 100,000 live births, respectively)
and a postneonatal infection death rate (96.4 per
100,000 live births), second only to American
Indians and Alaska Natives.50
CDC is committed to ensuring improved public
health services for underserved communities,
including ethnic and racial minorities who experi-
ence a disproportionate burden of illness and death
from infectious diseases. CDC is also committed to
ensuring the elimination of racial and ethnic
disparities in health outcomes to the greatest
extent possible.
Diseases of Travelers, Immigrants, and Refugees.
People who cross international boundaries—such
as tourists, business people and other workers, im-
migrants, and refugees—may be at increased risk
of contracting infectious diseases, and may also
disseminate diseases to new places. International
air travel has increased substantially in recent years,
and more Americans than ever before are visiting
remote and tropical locations. Tourists or workers
may be exposed to infectious agents against which
they have no immunity because the agents are un-
common in their native countries. Immigrants may
come from nations where diseases like tuberculo-
sis are endemic, and refugees may come from situ-
ations where crowding and malnutrition create
ideal conditions for the spread of diseases such as
cholera, malaria, measles, and varicella.
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SUMMARY OF THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The implementation of the objectives and activities described in this plan will help us realize CDC’s vision
of a world in which all available tools are used to combat today’s diseases and prevent those of tomorrow.
Many of the activities build on existing efforts or are in the planning stages. Others represent new efforts.
All require partnerships and a sustained commitment by federal, state, and local health agencies.
Goal I: Surveillance and Response
Detect, investigate, and monitor emerging pathogens,
the diseases they cause, and the factors influencing
their emergence, and respond to problems as they are
identified.
Objectives:
A. Strengthen infectious disease surveillance and
response.
B. Improve methods for gathering and evaluating
surveillance data.
C. Assure the use of surveillance data to improve
public health practice and medical treatment.
D. Strengthen global capacity to monitor and re-
spond to emerging infectious diseases.
Goal II:  Applied Research
Integrate laboratory science and epidemiology to opti-
mize public health practice.
Objectives:
A. Develop, evaluate, and disseminate tools for
identifying and understanding emerging infec-
tious diseases.
B. Identify the behaviors, environments, and host
factors that put people at increased risk for in-
fectious diseases and their sequelae.
C. Conduct research to develop and evaluate pre-
vention and control strategies in the nine tar-
get areas.
Goal III:  Infrastructure and Training
Strengthen public health infrastructures to support sur-
veillance and research and to implement prevention and
control programs.
Objectives:
A. Enhance epidemiologic and laboratory capacity.
B. Improve CDC’s ability to communicate elec-
tronically with state and local health depart-
ments, U.S. quarantine stations, health care pro-
fessionals, and others.
C. Enhance the nation’s capacity to respond to
complex infectious disease threats in the United
States and internationally, including outbreaks
that may result from bioterrorism.
D. Provide training opportunities in infectious dis-
ease epidemiology and diagnosis in the United
States and throughout the world.
Goal IV:  Prevention and Control
Ensure prompt implementation of prevention strategies
and enhance communication of public health informa-
tion about emerging diseases.
Objectives:
A. Implement, support, and evaluate programs for
the prevention and control of emerging infec-
tious diseases.
B. Develop, evaluate, and promote strategies to
help health care providers and other individu-
als change behaviors that facilitate disease trans-
mission.
C. Support and promote disease control and pre-
vention internationally.
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OBJECTIVE I-A.
Strengthen infectious disease
surveillance and response.
Public health surveillance is the ongoing, system-
atic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemi-
nation of health data, including information on
clinical diagnoses, laboratory-based diagnoses, spe-
cific syndromes, health-related behaviors, and use
of products related to health (for example, sales of
antimicrobial drugs). Epidemiologists use these data
to detect outbreaks; characterize disease transmis-
sion patterns by time, place, and person; evaluate
prevention and control programs; and project fu-
ture health care needs. Our nationwide system of
surveillance requires involvement and resources
from all levels of government, as well as a reversal
of the trend towards decreasing state and local sup-
port for disease surveillance, which began in the
1980s (see page 3).
CDC’s 1994 plan identified three complementary
programs to help rebuild the U.S. public health in-
frastructure for surveillance and response to infec-
tious diseases: the Epidemiology and Laboratory
Capacity (ELC) program, the Emerging Infections
Programs (EIPs), and provider-based sentinel
networks. These programs have enabled health de-
partments to identify and respond to public health
problems, as well as realize important research con-
tributions. In addition to expansion of these pro-
grams, other surveillance systems are needed that
address special health problems not covered by
routine surveillance.
G O A L   I :    S U R V E I L L A N C E   A N D   R E S P O N S E
Detect, investigate, and monitor emerging pathogens, the diseases they cause, and thefactors influencing their emergence, and respond to problems as they are identified.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Extend the ELC program to all state, territo-
rial, and large local health departments. The goal
of the ELC program is to help large health depart-
ments develop the core capacity to meet the infec-
tious disease threats of the future. ELC support pro-
vides health departments with the technical tools,
training, and financial resources to maintain sur-
veillance for infectious diseases of public health im-
portance, provide laboratory services, and investi-
gate outbreaks. Between September 1995 and Sep-
tember 1998, CDC entered into ELC agreements
with 30 states and localities (see Box 14). By 2002,
CDC plans to involve all 50 state health depart-
ments, as well as many territorial and large local
health agencies. Specific activities undertaken
through the ELC program include developing in-
novative systems for early detection and investiga-
tion of outbreaks, tracking antimicrobial resistance,
and ensuring electronic reporting of surveillance data.
ii. Strengthen the EIP network by increasing its
demographic and geographic representativeness
and enhancing its laboratory and epidemiologic
capacity. The EIPs (see Box 14) conduct popula-
tion-based surveillance and research that go beyond
the routine functions of local health departments
to address important issues in infectious diseases
and public health. These programs involve part-
nerships among state health departments, academic
centers, and CDC. In addition to conducting sur-
veillance, the EIP network participates in emergency
outbreak responses and addresses new problems
whenever they arise (see Box 15).
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EIP activities of the past few years have included
investigations of meningococcal and streptococcal
diseases. In addition, the EIPs have established sur-
veillance for unexplained deaths and severe illnesses
in previously healthy people less than 50 years old
in an attempt to determine which known infectious
diseases are not being recognized and to identify
new infectious agents that can cause severe diseases
or death.
In 1996, the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveil-
lance Network (FoodNet) was created within the
EIP sites in collaboration with CDC, the Food and
Drug Administration, and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (see Box 16). This program includes
active surveillance for diseases caused by foodborne
pathogens, case-control studies to identify risk fac-
tors for acquiring foodborne illness, and surveys
to assess medical and laboratory practices related
to the diagnosis and treatment of foodborne ill-
ness.
Over the next 5 years, three additional EIP sites
will be added, and existing sites will be strength-
ened. EIP priorities for 1998-2002 include deter-
mining the burden of foodborne and waterborne
diseases in the United States, increasing vaccina-
tion against invasive pneumococcal disease in
adults, and evaluating programs to prevent group B
streptococcal disease and retard the emergence and
transmission of antibiotic resistance. The EIPs will
also evaluate certain disease syndromes of unknown
origin, such as unexplained encephalitis, to learn
more about their causes and how to prevent them.
iii. Use the existing provider-based sentinel net-
works to monitor syndromes and diseases, and es-
tablish at least one additional network. The 1994
plan called for the establishment of provider-based
sentinel networks to study conditions that are not
covered by health department surveillance and that
Box 14 Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity
(ELC) and Emerging Infections Programs
(EIP) Cooperative Agreements
EIP
ELC
EIP and ELC HI
AK
This map shows the locations of health
departments with ELC and EIP cooperative
agreements as of September 1998.
Box 15 The EIPs Help Determine if Variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Is
Occurring in the United States
On March 20, 1996, an expert advisory committee to
the government of the United Kingdom announced
that several people had died from what appeared to
be a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD),
a fatal neurologic illness. The committee believed
that a transmissible agent that causes bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, commonly known
as “mad cow disease”) had spread from cattle to
humans through the consumption of contaminated
beef. The possibility was raised that these deaths
could represent the beginning of a human epidemic
of variant CJD. The cause of BSE is believed to be a
prion, a proteinaceous infectious particle without
nucleic acid that causes disease by inducing changes
in the folding of a previously normal brain protein.
The EIP network instituted active surveillance for
the new variant of CJD in the United States. By
comparing the results of labor-intensive active
surveillance (which included canvassing pathologists,
neuropathologists, and neurologists) with less
intensive methods, the EIPs showed that analysis of
death certificate data was a reasonably effective way
to monitor CJD. On August 9, 1996, CDC announced
that no cases had been detected at any of the U.S.
surveillance sites.
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are likely to be seen by specific kinds of health pro-
viders. In 1996 and 1997, three provider-based sen-
tinel networks were established:
Emergency Department Sentinel Network for
Emerging Infections (EMERGEncy ID NET) is
a network of academically affiliated emergency
medicine centers that operate emergency depart-
ments at 11 hospitals in large U.S. cities. The
network monitors a number of syndromes, in-
cluding bloody diarrhea, illnesses that follow ex-
posure to animals, illness in immigrants and trav-
elers, hemolytic uremic syndrome following in-
fection with Escherichia coli O157:H7, and first-
time seizures that are not associated with head
trauma or cancer (a possible indication of neuro-
cysticercosis).
Infectious Diseases Society of America Emerg-
ing Infections Network (IDSA EIN) is a network
of over 500 infectious disease practitioners. The
network surveys its members regularly on topi-
cal issues in clinical infectious diseases. It also
enhances communications and health education
among its members, collaborates in research
projects, and provides assistance in casefinding
during outbreak investigations. Its membership
represents a ready source of infectious disease
expertise for CDC and state health departments
to draw on during outbreaks or when unusual
illnesses occur.
Sentinel Network of Travel Medicine Clinics
(GeoSentinel) is composed of 22 travel medi-
cine clinics located in the United States and other
countries. The network monitors temporal and
geographic trends of infectious diseases among
travelers, immigrants, and refugees seen in these
clinics. The data are analyzed by CDC and can
be used to develop travel advisories and recom-
mendations for health care providers. In the fu-
ture, GeoSentinel may help track the spread of
diseases from place to place when outbreaks
occur.
CDC will also continue to strengthen other pro-
vider-based networks, such as the National Noso-
comial Infections Surveillance System, a national
source of data on hospital-related infections.
iv. Develop or improve infectious disease surveil-
lance in the nine target areas (see page 8). Surveil-
lance for many of the issues of concern in the tar-
get areas will be conducted through the mechanisms
described under previous activities in this plan.
However, in some cases, special systems will be
needed (see Box 17).
Box 16 FoodNet: Enhancing Food Safety in
 the United States
The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network
(FoodNet) and other surveillance systems provide
CDC with high-quality data on many types of
foodborne and waterborne illnesses, including enteric
illnesses caused by bacteria, parasites, and viruses,
and hemolytic uremic syndrome due to Escherichia
coli O157:H7. FoodNet also contributes to the
development of long-term strategies for preventing
outbreaks and is helping evaluate the burden of
waterborne diseases in the United States.
FoodNet conducts investigations of foodborne
infections and evaluates the effectiveness of
prevention and control programs. In 1996, its first year
of operation, FoodNet determined that Campylobacter
is the most frequently identified foodborne pathogen
in the United States. In 1997 it completed multistate
case-control studies on two other bacterial foodborne
microbes, Salmonella and  E. coli O157:H7. The
studies confirmed that regional variations in the
incidence of E. coli O157:H7 infections reflect real
differences in local infection rates rather than
variations in diagnostic testing.
In 1996, FoodNet helped identify outbreaks of
E. coli O157:H7 due to contaminated apple cider and
lettuce. As a consequence of these and other
investigations, apple juice manufacturers are now
asked to record on the product label whether their
juice is pasteurized. In addition, the lettuce industry
has begun to consider steps that will make lettuce
safer to eat.
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v. Develop new approaches to improve recognition
of rare events. Many emerging diseases are identi-
fied by astute clinicians or laboratorians. For ex-
ample, in 1993, a physician with the U.S. Indian
Health Service reported the unusual occurrence of
two deaths from sudden respiratory failure in pre-
viously healthy young adults. Through the com-
bined efforts of health departments in New Mexico
Arizona, Colorado, and Utah, the Indian Health
Box 17 Use of Molecular Epidemiology To Document the Interruption of Indigenous
Transmission of Measles in the United States
Service, and CDC, an additional 17 cases were
quickly identified. Within 3 weeks, the cause of this
syndrome was identified as a hantavirus—an agent
not previously known to cause respiratory problems.
CDC will explore new approaches for the rapid
identification of unusual events, including diseases
of unknown etiology and diseases caused by the
deliberate release of pathogenic agents by a terror-
ist or as a weapon of war.
The number of measles cases in the United
States continues to be low. Although
several outbreaks were reported in 1996
and 1997, molecular epidemiologic studies
indicated that they were most likely caused
by importation of measles from outside the
country, most frequently from western
Europe and Japan.51  When an outbreak of
measles occurs in the United States, an
index case (a “first” case to which each of
the other cases in the outbreak can be
traced) is identified, and the strain of
measles virus is isolated and sequenced to
determine its country of origin. The maps
indicate the origin (when known) of viruses
responsible for measles outbreaks in the
United States in 1996 and 1997. The
numbers correspond to the genetic group
of the measles virus isolated.
Over the last 5 years, millions of doses
of measles vaccine have been distributed
worldwide, and concerted efforts by the
Pan American Health Organization have
contributed to the unprecedented decline in
measles cases in the Americas. In 1994
and 1995, few (if any) cases of measles
were imported into the United States from
Latin America. These successes have
convinced many health experts to support
worldwide measles control efforts as a first
step towards the global eradication of
measles.
Pakistan
Kenya
Germany
Greece
Austria
Germany
England
Greece
Italy
Phillippines
Japan
Japan
73
4
5
2
3
5
5
5
5
7
4
34
3
5
4
Italy
1
Vietnam
Japan
Japan
Ukraine
Italy
Italy
Germany
China
Italy
Brazil
Brazil
4
5
4
8
8
4 4
3
3
4
74
1996
1997
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OBJECTIVE I-B.
Improve methods for gathering and
evaluating surveillance data.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Integrate public health information and surveil-
lance systems. CDC is helping to increase commu-
nication among information systems and to dis-
courage duplication of data collection, storage, and
transmission. This effort involves integrating sur-
veillance systems at CDC and working with fed-
eral, state, and local partners to help define system
specifications that will allow more efficient shar-
ing of data. Surveillance systems should be designed
to take advantage of data that are already in elec-
tronic form (for example, from clinical laborato-
ries). CDC is working with individual state health
departments to develop model systems for integrat-
ing surveillance at the state level through the Infor-
mation Network for Public Health Officials
(INPHO) program, which is partially supported by
the Robert W. Woodruff Foundation.
ii. Use integrated health care delivery systems to
enhance traditional public health surveillance. To
respond to changes in health care delivery, CDC
and health departments are developing new part-
nerships and new ways of conducting surveillance.
For example, CDC and health departments are
working closely with managed care organizations
and hospitals to use computerized medical records
for surveillance and research, while addressing is-
sues related to confidentiality. In addition, CDC is
working with health care organizations to ensure
that infectious disease data are included in efforts
to evaluate and improve health care quality. CDC
will also work with home health care providers to
adapt existing methods of hospital disease surveil-
lance to home health care settings. An early prior-
ity will be to establish a surveillance system for
bloodstream infections in home care patients.
iii.  Use new tools to improve surveillance. Mo-
lecular fingerprinting, for example, has provided
new approaches for disease surveillance and out-
break investigation. Molecular fingerprinting of mi-
crobes is similar to the DNA fingerprinting used
by forensic scientists to identify criminals who have
left bloodstains or strands of hair at the scene of a
crime. Fingerprinting techniques can distinguish
among strains or isolates of bacteria, fungi, viruses,
or parasites. Methods used for fingerprinting in-
clude comparing the genetic sequences of organ-
isms and comparing the sizes of nucleic acid frag-
ments produced after digestion with special en-
zymes. For viruses, it is more common to sequence
portions of the genome in order to compare differ-
ent strains.
Public health workers use molecular finger-
printing and sequencing to identify epidemics that
might otherwise go undetected and to trace out-
breaks to particular sources, such as water sup-
plies, food shipments, or infected animals or people.
When people become ill from vaccine-preventable
diseases, these tools are used to determine whether
the illness is caused by the microbial strains used
in vaccines or by wild-type strains (see Box 18).
Scientists are using these techniques to determine
the reason for recent increases in vaccine-prevent-
able diseases such as pertussis (whooping cough)
and rubella (German measles) among adults. CDC
also uses molecular analysis to guide the annual
selection of strains that are included in each year’s
influenza vaccine. In addition, molecular sequence
analysis has been useful in studying unusual cases
of HIV transmission and in tracking the spread of
HIV throughout the world.
CDC will continue to work with state health de-
partments to create real-time, on-line capacity to
compare strains of E. coli O157:H7 and Salmo-
nella (see Box 19), so that when an outbreak oc-
curs in the United States, neighboring states can
use subtyping methods to decide whether they need
to implement coordinated prevention and control
measures. CDC also supports regional laborato-
ries that are establishing a national database of
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molecular fingerprints of Mycobacterium tubercu-
losis isolates.
Other tools that can increase the usefulness of
surveillance include geographic information sys-
tems (see page 28) and computer programs that
detect subtle variations in patterns of surveillance
data that may indicate disease outbreaks.
OBJECTIVE I-C.
Ensure the use of surveillance data to
improve public health practice and medical
treatment.
Surveillance data provide the basis for public health
action. These data are used to evaluate disease con-
trol interventions, identify disease risk factors, and
improve clinical practice, as well as to detect out-
breaks.
Box 18 Pertussis in the United States and Abroad
Pertussis, or whooping cough, is a vaccine-preventable
bacterial disease that can cause fatalities, especially in
children less than 1 year old. After whole-cell pertussis
vaccines were introduced in the mid 1940s, the inci-
dence of this disease in the United States declined
dramatically. However, since 1980 the incidence has
been rising. In 1996, 7,796 cases occurred—the highest
annual number reported since 1967. Although infants and
young children continue to have the highest rates of
pertussis, those rates have not increased since 1993. On
the other hand, the incidence among adolescents and
adults has increased substantially.52
An evaluation of the U.S. pertussis vaccination
program by CDC concluded that it is still highly effective
for young children.53  However, immunity diminishes in
many adolescents and adults, and no vaccine is licensed
for those age groups. In addition, some portion of the
increase in adolescent and adult cases may be due to
improved recognition and reporting. CDC continues to
advise that all children receive the currently recom-
mended 5-dose regimen of pertussis vaccinations.
Protection for adolescents and adults is achieved through
early diagnosis and treatment and through prompt
prophylaxis for those who have been in contact with
infected people.
An increasing incidence of pertussis is a concern in
certain other countries as well, although the reasons for
the resurgence may not be the same as in the United
States. Large outbreaks have occurred in the Netherlands
and Canada, mostly affecting infants and children, many of
whom have been vaccinated. A molecular analysis
suggests that the strains of pertussis currently in circula-
tion in the Netherlands are different from those that were
observed in the past.54  Another study concluded that
pertussis strains isolated during recent outbreaks in
Canada are different from current whole-cell vaccine
strains.55  One hypothesis under evaluation is that new
strains of pertussis may have evolved that are not affected
by the vaccines used in the Netherlands and Canada.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Use surveillance data to analyze questions of
public health importance. Surveillance data can be
used to identify risk factors for new diseases and
to evaluate prevention guidelines for known ones.
For example, surveillance data gathered by the EIPs
on group B streptococcal (GBS) infections have
been used to evaluate the guidelines for diagnosis
and treatment of GBS infection during pregnancy
(see Box 20). Data gathered by the EIPs on Strep-
tococcus pneumoniae infections have been used to
evaluate clinical outcomes associated with drug-
resistant infections and to model the cost-effective-
ness of vaccinating the elderly against this organ-
ism. CDC is currently using surveillance data as
one means of assessing the effectiveness of routine
HIV counseling and testing of pregnant women for
reducing perinatal transmission of HIV. Through
December 1997, data indicate a continuing decrease
in the numbers of U.S. children with perinatally
transmitted HIV infection (see Box 21).
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Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) is a method of
molecular fingerprinting. The picture shows the relation-
ships among PFGE patterns of  Escherichia coli O157:H7
isolates from Washington State. The PFGE patterns of
the two isolates from apple juice are identical to the
patterns of isolates from patients who drank the contami-
nated juice, but different from those from patients whose
infections were not juice-related. This technology has
been used to identify outbreaks of foodborne illnesses,
especially those that involve clusters of cases that are
too geographically or temporally scattered to come to
public health attention through usual methods of
surveillance.
In partnership with state health departments and the
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), CDC is
creating a molecular subtyping network called PulseNet,
which is based on DNA fingerprinting of bacteria that
cause foodborne diseases. The project is being imple-
mented for Escherichia coli O157:H7 and will soon be
extended to include Salmonella Typhimurium and other
foodborne pathogens. All participants will use standard-
ized equipment and protocols, and a centralized database
Box 19 Using Subtyping Data To Identify Outbreaks
of DNA patterns (“DNA fingerprints”) will be stored on a
computer server at CDC. Through the participation of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), the database will include
fingerprints derived from contaminated foods as well as
from clinical isolates.
When outbreaks occur, participating laboratories will
submit DNA fingerprints such as the ones shown in the
picture for comparison with those in the database. A
fingerprint analysis can be completed at a local laboratory
in 24 hours, and electronic patterns can be matched by
computer within a few minutes. If a submitted pattern
matches a pattern on the server, the submitting labora-
tory will be able to download epidemiologic data associ-
ated with the E. coli strain that exhibits that pattern. If the
submitted pattern is not an exact match, information on
the closest matches will be provided. If the same DNA
pattern is submitted by two or more participating
laboratories within a short time, the CDC server will warn
each participating laboratory that a multistate outbreak
may be in progress.
* Vertical line at 100% represents isolates that are indistinguishable from each other. Lines farther away from 100% on
the dendrogram indicate isolates have similarities to the outbreak isolates but are not a perfect match.
E. coli isolates from patients whose
infections were not juice related
E. coli isolates from patients who drank
contaminated juice (note that they were
identical to the juice isolates)
Juice isolates
Normalized PFGE patternsDendrogram*
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Over the next 5 years, CDC will use surveillance
data from many sources to assess the impact of
programs to promote high levels of vaccine cover-
age in children, adolescents, and adults and inter-
ventions to prevent the spread of antimicrobial re-
sistance in hospitals and communities. Surveillance
data may also be helpful in assessing health care-
associated outcomes (such as infections) in people
undergoing outpatient surgery or being discharged
after shortened hospital stays. Such data will also
be used to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies
for preventing infections in people with impaired
host defenses and to assess the effectiveness of
postexposure prophylaxis for health care workers
with inadvertent occupational exposure to such
infections as hepatitis B and HIV (see Box 22).
Should irradiation of food come into wide use, sur-
veillance data will be used to help evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of this intervention (see Box 31). Be-
Box  20 Surveillance Data Show Reduction in
Group B Streptococcal Disease
During the 1970s, group B Streptococcus (GBS)
became the leading cause of sepsis and meningitis
among newborns throughout the United States,
leading to death in approximately 50% of the infants
infected. During the 1980s, improved recognition and
treatment reduced the case-fatality rate to about
10%. However, an estimated 8,000 cases of serious
neonatal infection continued to occur each year.
During the 1990s, working in partnership with
organizations of health professionals and community-
based groups, CDC issued guidelines that recom-
mended antibiotic treatment during delivery for
women at risk of transmitting GBS infection to their
newborns. A study by CDC concluded that up to
79% of the GBS infections that occurred in 1995
were potentially preventable. Moreover, the data
indicated that, although the incidence of neonatal
GBS infections has declined up to 43% in some
areas, no change has occurred in others.21
CDC has recommended that GBS prevention
activities be integrated into all obstetric care
programs. It has also begun an evaluation of the
barriers that impede the implementation of effective
control measures.
sides using surveillance data at the national level
for the development and evaluation of prevention
strategies, CDC will provide information that lo-
cal health departments can use in the practice of
public health.
ii. Facilitate access to surveillance data that can
be used in clinical practice. One way to disseminate
this kind of information is through the Internet. For
example, since 1995, rates of nosocomial infections
associated with catheters and other invasive devices
in intensive care unit patients and rates of antimi-
crobial resistance in hospitalized patients have been
published semiannually on the Internet and in the
medical literature.56  Hospitals can use these data
to assess their infection control strategies.
Box  21 Surveillance To Evaluate Prevention
of Perinatal HIV Transmission
Each year, over 6,000 HIV-infected women give birth in
the United States,57 where perinatal transmission
accounts for virtually all new HIV infections in infants.
Before interventions were available, HIV infection had
become a leading cause of death in children aged 1-4
years. In 1994, a clinical trial found that zidovudine,
given to mothers prenatally and at delivery and to their
babies immediately after birth, could reduce the risk of
perinatal transmission of HIV by 66%.58  (In the
absence of zidovudine treatment, around 25% of
newborns were infected.)  Subsequently, the U.S.
Public Health Service issued guidelines recommending
HIV counseling and voluntary testing for all pregnant
women and zidovudine therapy for those infected.
Surveillance data indicate that the guidelines have
had a significant impact. Since implementation of the
guidelines began, the incidence of pediatric AIDS has
been reduced over 40%. In addition, rates of HIV
testing of pregnant women have improved signifi-
cantly, and maternal and newborn zidovudine therapy
has been well accepted.59  Nevertheless, more HIV
infections in newborns could be prevented. Studies are
underway to evaluate the relative contributions of a
number of potential factors (for example, lack of
prenatal care, poor provider adherence to the guide-
lines, poor patient adherence to therapy, and
zidovudine resistance) to the continuing problem of
pediatric HIV infection.
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Box  22 The HIV Postexposure Prophylaxis
Registry
Exposures to bloodborne pathogens pose a serious
occupational threat to health care workers. Between
500,000 and one million needlestick injuries occur
annually in the United States, and about 1% of them
may involve an HIV-infected source.
As of December 1997, CDC had received reports
of 54 documented cases and 132 possible cases of
occupationally acquired HIV infection among health
care workers in the United States. Although
postexposure treatment with antiretroviral agents is
an important component of the prevention of
occupationally acquired HIV infection, little information
exists on the use and toxicity of antiretroviral drugs
(with the exception of zidovudine) for the prevention
of HIV in people exposed to the virus.
The HIV Postexposure Prophylaxis (PEP) Registry
is designed to evaluate the use of antiretroviral drugs
in health care workers who receive PEP for occupa-
tional HIV exposure. By collecting information on the
worker’s exposure, antiretroviral therapy, symptoms,
and laboratory findings, this registry will help clarify
the safety of PEP. The registry began in October
1996, and 279 health care workers were enrolled as
of February 1998. Overall, 77% of health care workers
who undergo PEP experience some symptoms due to
the treatment. CDC publicized the registry by
distributing thousands of educational packets and
brochures to health care workers.
ACTIVITIES:
i. In partnership with other U.S. agencies, na-
tional governments, WHO, the World Bank, other
international organizations, and the CISET Emerg-
ing Infectious Disease Task Force (see page 7), work
to strengthen global surveillance and response to
emerging infectious diseases. This will involve im-
proving global communications, expanding disease
surveillance, and preparing protocols for detecting
and responding to outbreaks of emerging infectious
diseases. It is especially important that disease
surveillance be enhanced in developing nations,
where emerging diseases may go undetected for
long periods.
Early warning systems to detect drug-resistant
pathogens can help limit the spread of antimicro-
bial  resistance and enable local governments and
health care providers to improve patient care and
public health. As part of this effort, CDC will also
continue to work with other agencies and nations
to expand laboratory capability, assist in training
public health professionals, and expand interna-
tional surveillance for antimicrobial resistance.
CDC will also build on existing international col-
laborations to monitor new strains of HIV to pro-
tect the U.S. blood supply and to contribute to
ongoing efforts to develop a vaccine against HIV.
ii. Assist global surveillance and response efforts
through increased support of CDC-based WHO
Collaborating Centers. CDC sponsors 46 WHO
Collaborating Centers, 32 of which are related to
infectious disease epidemiology, laboratory diag-
nosis, research, training, and control. They are part
of a global network of more than 1,000 infectious
disease collaborating centers worldwide that ad-
dresses such issues as reference diagnostic work on
foodborne diseases, respiratory diseases, botulism,
malaria, measles, meningitis, arthropod-borne dis-
eases, rickettsial diseases, and special viral patho-
gens (such as hantavirus and other viruses that
cause hemorrhagic fevers).
OBJECTIVE I-D.
Strengthen global capacity to monitor and
respond to emerging infectious diseases.
Because of the ease and frequency of modern travel,
it is no longer possible to protect the health of U.S.
citizens without addressing infectious disease prob-
lems that are occurring elsewhere in the world. As
stated in the 1996 Presidential Decision Directive
on Emerging Infectious Diseases, the United States
is committed to working with international part-
ners to promote an inclusive, global network for
surveillance and response to infectious diseases.37
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iii. Help monitor conditions that favor the emer-
gence or spread of infectious diseases. CDC will
establish liaisons with international organizations
that provide medical treatment to refugees and
other displaced people, and track population move-
ments that may be associated with epidemic dis-
eases. CDC will also help monitor infectious dis-
eases in areas altered by development projects that
change the habitats of vectors and animals that
carry human pathogens, and the agency will par-
ticipate in international efforts to address environ-
Box  23 Drug-Resistant Malaria
Malaria is a leading killer of young children. As shown in this map, resistance to antimalarial drugs is widespread,
involving most parts of the world where malaria is found. For many years, chloroquine was the mainstay of malaria
treatment and control. However, resistance to chloroquine by Plasmodium falciparum, the parasite that causes the most
severe form of malaria, has spread and intensified in almost all malaria-endemic areas. Moreover, P. falciparum has
developed resistance to many other antimalarial drugs. In some areas of Southeast Asia, resistance has been reported to
chloroquine, sulfadoxine/pyrimethamine, mefloquine, halofantrine, and quinine, leaving combination therapies that include
artemisinins as the only effective treatment. In 1989, a chloroquine-resistant strain of  Plasmodium vivax was reported in
Papua, New Guinea, which was the first time a non-P. falciparum malaria species had exhibited resistance to any major
antimalarial drug. Data such as these are critical for helping nations to establish appropriate malaria treatment policies and
ensure the availability of drugs that will be effective against this disease.
mental and climatic phenomena that may influence
the emergence of infectious pathogens. To help
control the emergence and spread of drug-resistant
microbes, CDC will work with other nations to
address policies related to prescription practices,
patient compliance with drug regimens, and other
behavioral issues (see Box 23). CDC will also help
focus attention on policies that allow antimicro-
bial agents to be sold without prescription on the
open market.
Sulfadoxine/pyrimethamine, 
mefloquine
resistance
Sulfadoxine/
pyrimethamine
resistance 
Sulfadoxine/
pyrimethamine,
mefloquine, 
halofantrine,
quinine
resistance 
Mefloquine
resistance
= Chloroquine resistance
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G O A L   I I :    A P P L I E D   R E S E A R C H
Integrate laboratory science and epidemiology to optimize public health practice.
OBJECTIVE II-A.
Develop, evaluate, and disseminate
tools for identifying and understand-
ing emerging infectious diseases.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Develop, evaluate, and disseminate test-
ing methods for infectious agents. Diagnos-
tic tests are essential to disease surveillance
and outbreak response, as well as to clinical
management of patients with infectious dis-
eases. Sensitive, specific, rapid, and inexpen-
sive testing methods are lacking for many
emerging infectious organisms. For some
organisms, existing testing methods cannot
distinguish between past and current infec-
tions. For others (such as HIV and malaria
parasites), “point-of-care” methods are
needed to provide test results while the pa-
tient is still at the clinic or office. Moreover,
many methods are too expensive for routine
use in developing countries or not rugged
enough for large-scale studies in the field.
Improved methods of detecting antimicro-
bial resistance in clinical settings are also
needed.
CDC will continue to encourage intramu-
ral and extramural research to develop di-
agnostic testing methods (see Box 24), par-
ticularly for “orphan” diseases—those for
which the market for diagnostic testing is
not great enough to stimulate research and
development by private industry.
Box  24 Advances in Diagnosis of
Chlamydia trachomatis Infections
Chlamydia trachomatis is responsible for about 4 million new
infections every year in the United States. Although most
genital chlamydial infections in women (and up to half of those
in men) are asymptomatic, they can have significant conse-
quences, such as infertility in women. However, many people
remain unaware that they are infected and unknowingly pass
the infection on to their sexual partners. Obtaining cervical and
urethral specimens for traditional diagnostic testing requires
intrusive procedures that may not be acceptable to asymptom-
atic people. However, new methods have been developed
that rely on DNA amplification techniques that can detect
microbial nucleic acids in urine samples. These noninvasive
tests provide new opportunities for outreach and screening
of asymptomatic people. This is particularly important for
adolescents, who are at highest risk for infection and for
serious complications due to untreated infections.
Multicenter evaluations of these new methods indicate that
they are far more sensitive than traditional assays. CDC has
contributed to the evaluation and support of these methods by
providing reference diagnostic services to laboratories across
the country and by overseeing a national Chlamydia laboratory
committee in collaboration with the Association of Public
Health Laboratories. CDC’s guidelines on the use of nucleic
acid amplification methods for the detection of Chlamydia
trachomatis and Neisseria gonorrhoeae infections are sched-
uled for publication in 1999.
Nucleic acid amplification methods for chlamydia infec-
tions are used in large-scale screening projects such as the
federally funded National Program for Prevention of Infertility
due to Sexually Transmitted Diseases. This program was
created through a collaboration between CDC and the Office
of Population Affairs, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. Through this program, all states can provide
screening and treatment services in family planning clinics
and sexually transmitted disease clinics. In some places,
screening services have been expanded to nonclinical
settings such as schools and youth detention centers.
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Box  25 Evaluating Diagnostic Test Kits for
Lyme Disease
Lyme disease is the most common vectorborne
disease in the United States, and the number of
Lyme disease cases has been steadily increasing. In
1990, more than 20 commercial test kits were
available for serologic diagnosis of Lyme disease in
humans. However, an evaluation by CDC rated each
of them as poor, unstandardized, and unreliable.
Thus, treatment recommendations and public health
policy decisions were being based on faulty data.
Working with the Association of Public Health
Laboratories (APHL), the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the U.S. National Institutes of
Health (NIH), the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists (CSTE), university researchers, and
test kit manufacturers, CDC standardized an
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and a
Western blot (WB) assay for the diagnosis of Lyme
disease. CDC also cosponsored a national meeting
which recommended a two-step approach involving
both ELISA and WB. The two-step method has been
widely adopted as the standard for clinical testing
and research, and it is now being evaluated in the
clinical setting.
Box  26 Using Geographic Data To
Understand Disease
New tools that facilitate the collection and analysis
of spatial data include global positioning systems
(GPS), which are hand-held units that pinpoint
locations by longitude, latitude, and altitude;
geographic information systems (GIS), which use a
set of locations provided by GPS to create detailed
computer maps; and satellite-derived remotely
sensed (RS) data.
At the CDC research station in western Kenya,
scientists are using GPS to map 7,500 households,
rivers, roads, and medical facilities within a
75-square-mile area. By linking the map to an
epidemiologic database, the GIS program provides
information on how many cases of malaria occurred
at each household, whether the malaria strains
were drug-resistant, whether mosquito breeding
grounds were present, and whether children died.
Epidemiologists plan to use this map to answer
questions that could not easily be answered before:
Does proximity to mosquito breeding grounds
increase childhood mortality?  Does proximity to a
medical facility decrease childhood mortality?
Is drug resistance spreading in a predictable
pattern? Public health officials can also use the
map to target intensive vector control measures
to households that harbor large numbers of
mosquitoes.
RS data systems provide information on climate,
soil types, and distribution of plant life and bodies of
water. By examining a series of RS pictures taken
every few months and superimposed on GIS maps,
epidemiologists can study the relationship between
environmental changes and the incidence of
disease. For example, scientists at CDC, the Indian
Health Service, and Johns Hopkins University are
using RS and GPS to map cases of hantavirus
pulmonary syndrome, an often-fatal respiratory
disease carried by rodents. The maps incorporate
information on rainfall, vegetation, and rodent
populations. Scientists are using these data to
identify environmental conditions that are associ-
ated with increased risk of human disease. These
studies may lead to the development of methods
for predicting environmental conditions that might
result in outbreaks of animalborne and insectborne
diseases, so that prevention measures can be
taken.
The number of commercially available diagnos-
tic test kits is expected to increase markedly in the
near future. CDC will continue to work with the
Food and Drug Administration and others to en-
sure that commercially manufactured test kits are
evaluated and to make recommendations about
their use (see Box 25).
ii.  Develop, evaluate, and implement approaches
for identifying factors that influence the risk of
infection and disease. New tools for studying in-
fection and disease are being developed at a rapid
rate. These include new methods for modeling risk
factor data and new laboratory tools (see Box 18).
In addition, special tools for the collection and
analysis of risk factor data, such as geographic
information systems (GIS) and remote sensing
technologies, are being developed; the potential
applications of these new technologies are still
being explored (see Box 26).
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OBJECTIVE II-B.
Identify the behaviors, environments, and
host factors that put people at increased risk
for infectious diseases and their sequelae.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Identify factors that influence the risk of devel-
oping infectious diseases. The identification of dis-
ease risk factors (see Box 27) has been a concern
of public health officials since earliest times. For
example, in the first century B.C., the Roman people
were warned against locating farms near marshy
places because of the risk of the disease now known
as malaria.60 In modern times, the range of risk
factors under study has increased. New areas of
risk factor research include the relationship between
health care practices and infection rates (see Box
28); the relationship between changes in the envi-
ronment (such as climate change) and the incidence
and distribution of diseases; and the impact of
people’s genetic makeup on their susceptibility to
disease and response to treatment. Other impor-
tant risk factors include some that have been tradi-
tionally studied as risk factors for chronic diseases,
such as smoking, which may increase rates of pneu-
monia and Legionnaires’ disease, and exposure to
second-hand smoke, which can increase suscepti-
bility to ear infections in children.61
When programs to prevent or control specific
diseases are in progress, risk factor research is criti-
cal for understanding why cases continue to occur
and how to prevent them. For example, routine
rubella immunization protects children and adults
born in the United States from German measles,
which can cause birth defects when it infects preg-
nant women. In contrast, high rates of rubella
among adults from Latin America have highlighted
the need not only to improve immunization rates
among Hispanic populations in the United States,
but also to encourage other countries to implement
rubella immunization programs.
Risk factor research conducted by CDC involves
close collaboration between laboratory scientists and
epidemiologists, who use the results to design new
prevention and treatment strategies and evaluate their
effectiveness.
ii. Assess the role of infectious agents in causing
or exacerbating chronic diseases and syndromes for
which the causative agents are unknown. As de-
scribed on pages 10–11 and in Box 29, several
chronic diseases once thought to be caused by
lifestyle or environmental factors are actually
caused or intensified by infectious agents. These
findings have profound implications for the treat-
ment and prevention of chronic diseases. CDC will
play a major role in assessing new research find-
ings, encouraging and conducting further research
where needed, and disseminating information to
physicians and other health care providers. CDC
will also help translate new research findings into
prevention strategies; for example, CDC will con-
tinue to inform people that antibiotics should be
used to treat peptic ulcer disease.
In addition, CDC will support research on ill-
nesses for which the responsible agent is unknown,
but thought to be infectious. For example, in a re-
cent research study at 10 large hospitals, no infec-
tious agent was identified in stool samples from
over 90% of patients being evaluated for diarrhea
with routine diagnostic procedures.62
30 Preventing Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Strategy for the 21st Century
Box  27 Examples of New Risk Factors and Sources for Infection Identified by CDC Investigations,
1994–1998
Outbreak investigations provide some of the most important opportunities for identifying risk factors for disease. The
investigations described below were conducted in collaboration with many partners in state and local health depart-
ments, other federal agencies, and other organizations. Foodborne outbreaks are described in Box 8.
Year Location Problem Finding Implications
1994 United States Hepatitis C28 Strong association Led to requirement for viral inacti-
with particular lots vation steps and new testing
of intravenous (IV) procedures to ensure safety of IV and
immunoglobulin intramuscular (IM) immunoglobulin
from one company. products.
1994 Rhode Island Bloodstream BSIs associated First outbreak to link these devices
infections with use of needleless with adverse outcomes in patients.
(BSIs)63 inoculation devices.
Findings led to CDC
recommendations on
the use and management
of needleless devices.
1995 Democratic Ebola Transmission linked No evidence of airborne transmission.
Republic of infection64 to direct contact Led to updating of policies for managing
Congo with ill patients. patients with viral hemorrhagic fever
in the United States.
1996 Indiana Vancomycin- Illness linked to Highlighted rapid spread of this
resistant prior use of anti- strain in the United States. Also
enterococci65 biotics. Implement- showed feasibility and effectiveness of
ation of control control measures to reduce the spread
measures reduced of antibiotic-resistant organisms in
transmission. hospitals.
1997-98 New York HIV Cluster of cases HIV detection and prevention
of HIV infection in programs need to be strengthened
women who had in rural communities.
sexual contact with
one HIV-positive man.
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Box  28 Bloodstream Infections in ICU
and Home Health Care Patients
Since 1993, CDC has investigated three outbreaks
of bloodstream infection (BSI) among patients in
intensive care units (ICUs) that were associated
with decreases in nurse-to-patient ratios.66,67  In
each of these outbreaks, rates of BSI increased
when the number of health care workers per
patient decreased or when the level of training of
those workers decreased. The epidemiologic
relationship between nursing staff numbers and
training levels and the rates of BSIs remained
significant even after controlling for other factors.
Since that time, CDC has also investigated three
outbreaks of BSIs among patients receiving home
infusion therapy.63,68,69  Risk factors for these
outbreaks include practices related to care of the
intravenous line, the use of particular types of
intravenous devices, and socioeconomic factors.
Interventions that involve teaching and training
home health care providers and families of home
care patients are being evaluated.
Box  29 Role of Chlamydia pneumoniae
Infection in Coronary Artery Disease
and Atherosclerosis
Chlamydia pneumoniae is a common bacterium that
infects more than 50% of people at some point in
their lives.70  It causes about 10% of all pneumonias
and may play a role in the pathology of acute asthma
and chronic bronchitis.70,71 Current research suggests
that C. pneumoniae may also contribute to heart
attacks, strokes, and claudication from atherosclero-
sis, a painful condition in which circulation to the legs
or other parts of the body is inadequate.
Chlamydia pneumoniae has been found in the
atherosclerotic lesions of coronary arteries, carotid
arteries, the aorta, smaller cerebral vessels, and
larger peripheral arteries.72–75  In laboratory cultures
and in animal models, infection with this organism
can produce the same types of inflammatory
processes found in diseased arteries of the
heart.76,77  In addition, studies have demonstrated
rising or elevated levels of antibodies to this bacte-
rium in some men during the months just preceding
a heart attack.78 Two recent small studies indicate
that antibiotics given during or after a first heart
attack may decrease the risk of a second cardiac
problem.79,80 This finding raises the possibility that
antibiotics may have a role in the treatment of
cardiovascular illnesses. Further collaboration is
needed among clinicians, epidemiologists, and
laboratory scientists to define the role of C.
pneumoniae in heart and vascular disease and to
design new treatments and prevention strategies.
iii.  Investigate the risk from poorly understood
infectious agents of potential public health impor-
tance. As our arsenal of diagnostic testing meth-
ods has improved, so has the number of organisms
we can identify in human, animal, and environ-
mental samples. However, our ever-more-sensitive
tests sometimes detect microbes that are not neces-
sarily pathogenic (for example, hepatitis G). In
other cases, an organism has been associated with
a specific illness, but its role in causing or exacer-
bating the illness remains unclear (for example,
human herpesvirus-8 and Kaposi’s sarcoma).
The transplantation of animal organs into hu-
man beings is being tested in the United States and
elsewhere as a therapeutic procedure for certain
life-threatening illnesses. However, many scientists
fear that infectious agents carried by transplanted
organs (and not known to infect humans) may be
capable of causing disease under the special con-
ditions of transplantation (see Box 30). The use
of animal tissue or other products in humans may
also facilitate the transmission of zoonoses.
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Box  30 Xenotransplantation
More than 50,000 people who need organ trans-
plants die every year while waiting for a compatible
organ. Because of the growing demand for, and the
shortage of, human organs, transplant centers are
turning to nonhuman animals. For example, doctors
are experimenting with implants of fetal pig neuronal
tissues to treat people who have Parkinson’s
disease, and with implants of pig liver cells to
maintain liver function in people with catastrophic
liver failure until a human liver can be found.
However, medical experts are concerned that some
animal organs and tissues may harbor persistent
viruses that might infect humans, and that these
viruses could cause uncontrollable human epidemics.
This fear is underscored by the possibility that the
HIV pandemic may have been caused by the
transmission of a virus from monkeys to humans.
CDC is working with other Public Health Service
agencies to draft guidelines for preventing the
transmission of infectious agents during
xenotransplantation, to monitor patients who receive
xenotransplants, and to develop diagnostic assays for
viruses that may be present in xenografts from pigs
and baboons. CDC also supports the establishment
of a national registry of xenotransplantation recipi-
ents, the creation of a repository for specimens from
source animals and human recipients, and the
development of a National Xenotransplantation
Advisory Committee.
OBJECTIVE II-C.
Conduct research to develop and evaluate
prevention and control strategies in the nine
target areas.
CDC will continue to support and encourage re-
search to create tools for the prevention and con-
trol of infectious diseases, including the develop-
ment of drugs and vaccines, methods for disinfect-
ing food and water, and behavioral interventions
to prevent transmission. Another priority is to de-
termine how best to implement and promote strat-
egies for prevention and control of infectious dis-
eases.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Work with partners in government, industry, and
other sectors to develop and evaluate vaccines and
products for immunotherapy, such as immunoglo-
bulins. The National Institutes of Health, CDC,
and their partners are helping develop state-of-the-
art formulations, (such as DNA vaccines, live-
vector vaccines, conjugate vaccines, and multicom-
ponent vaccines) for the prevention of such diverse
diseases as tuberculosis, Lyme disease, malaria,
HIV/AIDS, dengue hemorrhagic fever, and influ-
enza. Priorities in vaccine research include the fol-
lowing: identifying characteristics of the immune
response that provide protection against particu-
lar diseases (in individuals with intact immune
systems as well as in individuals who are immuno-
compromised); determining which components of
a microbe are most effective at eliciting protective
immune responses in humans; developing improved
model systems for the evaluation of new vaccines;
and participating in field evaluations of new vac-
cines. In addition, CDC will continue to conduct
research related to the development of immuno-
globulins that can be used to prevent or treat emerg-
ing infectious diseases.
CDC will also continue to work closely with
FDA to expand existing mechanisms for ensuring
vaccine safety and efficacy, such as providing an
adequate cold chain, developing heat-stable vac-
cines, testing vaccine preparations for the presence
of adventitious agents when required, and devel-
oping adjuvants that are safe for human use.
ii.  In collaboration with other organizations, sup-
port research to develop and evaluate new antimi-
crobial drugs and prophylactic agents, as well as
methods to control disease vectors and reservoirs.
For many diseases that are not vaccine-preventable,
drug therapy is crucial. For some diseases (for ex-
ample, Ebola hemorrhagic fever and crypto-
sporidiosis), there is currently no effective drug
therapy. For other diseases, more effective, less
toxic, and cheaper drugs are sorely needed. For still
others, new drugs are needed because of microbial
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resistance to existing medications. For example, cer-
tain strains of enterococci are no longer sensitive
to any commercially available antibiotic.
Controlling vectorborne and zoonotic diseases
requires both pharmacologic treatment and vector
control using insecticides, molluscicides, or roden-
ticides. Genetic modifications that decrease an
insect’s ability to transmit disease may become
important public health tools in the future.
CDC’s priorities in drug and pesticide develop-
ment include
• Working with industry to encourage the devel-
opment of new antimicrobial agents.
• Supporting efficacy trials of new drugs and treat-
ments in the United States and internationally.
• Developing strategies to reduce insect vector
populations.
• Developing and evaluating methods to control
animal populations that serve as reservoirs for
human diseases.
iii. Support research to develop new methods of
disinfection. Disinfection procedures are important
for a wide range of products. CDC priorities in-
clude assessing new methods for sterilization of
food (see Box 31) and reducing contamination of
water, assessing methods for the inactivation of
pathogens in blood and blood products, and pro-
moting the development and increased use of syn-
thetic blood products produced by recombinant
DNA techniques. In the developing world, a
method for providing safe drinking water that
includes disinfection and safe storage appears
promising in evaluations in homes, marketplaces,
and clinics; this system has the potential to greatly
reduce transmission of waterborne diseases.81
CDC will also continue to study the role of the
hospital environment in facilitating the spread of
infections and to identify new ways of preventing
these infections. CDC efforts include the following:
• Learning how bacteria interact with environmen-
tal surfaces and medical devices, using scanning
electron microscopy and other tools.
• Determining how to control biofilms on medi-
cal devices and tubing, and in water systems in
medical settings. (Biofilms are coatings that de-
velop inside water distribution systems, such as
water lines in dental equipment, which can har-
bor infectious organisms.)
• Assessing new methods for disinfection and re-
use of dialysis equipment.
• Determining whether microbes are developing
resistance to environmental disinfectants.
• Assessing new approaches to filtering air and
otherwise reducing the spread of airborne or-
ganisms.
Box  31 Pasteurization of Solid Foods
In the United States, heat pasteurization is used
routinely to kill pathogens in milk and certain other
liquid foods. Over the past few years, however,
outbreaks associated with uncooked or undercooked
food have stimulated interest in using terminal
treatment methods on solid foods as well. In the
future, pasteurizing technologies for solid foods may
solve public health problems that cannot be remedied
by improving human or animal sanitation, or through
other measures that are currently in use. Such
problems include bacterial and parasitic contamination
of fresh berries and contamination of fresh poultry by
Camplylobacter and Salmonella.
At the present time, gamma irradiation is the best
studied of the potential cold pasteurization tech-
niques. It has been approved by the FDA for use on
fruits and vegetables, spices, chicken, and red meat.
Research is also underway on other pasteurization
methods, including techniques that rely on pulsed
energy and bright light.
Because pasteurization does not destroy all
microorganisms and because contamination can occur
after pasteurization, good food processing and
handling practices will still be necessary, even when
the use of irradiated food becomes more widespread.
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iv. Support social science and behavioral research
to develop better prevention programs. Most fac-
tors associated with disease emergence depend on
human behavior. Thus, designing disease preven-
tion strategies requires an understanding of the be-
havior of patients, families, and health care work-
ers. CDC has a key role in conducting social and
behavioral research to identify the attitudes, per-
ceptions, and expectations that motivate patients
and health care providers to comply with guide-
lines or treatment. Behavioral research is also
needed to develop better communication messages
and channels to facilitate the implementation of
community- and hospital-based prevention pro-
grams (see Box 32). For example, CDC is using
focus groups and other research to identify barri-
ers to the appropriate use of antibiotics by physi-
cians and parents. CDC will also evaluate the im-
pact of interventions aimed at changing beliefs and
behaviors that promote disease transmission or
impede medical treatment, and will assess the rela-
tive roles of guidelines, public education, formu-
lary controls, and other methods in improving pub-
lic health.
Box  32 Project Respect
The correct and consistent use of male condoms (or,
if male condoms cannot be used, female condoms)
during sexual intercourse is highly effective in
preventing HIV infection, as well as other sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs).
Between 1993 and 1995, in partnership with
several other organizations, CDC conducted Project
Respect—a randomized trial of alternative ap-
proaches to counseling people who visit STD clinics
on how to prevent HIV and other STDs. One group
received simple educational messages, while
others received intensive counseling that focused
on the particulars of the client’s personal situation.
After 6 months, people who received client-
centered counseling were significantly more likely
to use condoms 100% of the time and had signi-
ficantly fewer new STDs. At 12 months, rates of
condom use were similar in the two groups but the
reduced rate of new STDs persisted among people
who received client-centered counseling.82  CDC
and other Project Respect investigators are translat-
ing these research findings into prevention programs
that can be delivered in other clinical settings.
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G O A L   I I I :    I N F R A S T R U C T U R E   A N D   T R A I N I N G
Strengthen public health infrastructures to support surveillance and research and toimplement prevention and control programs.
OBJECTIVE III-A.
Enhance epidemiologic and laboratory
capacity.
The public health infrastructure is the underlying
foundation that supports the planning, delivery, and
evaluation of public health activities and practices.
CDC’s ongoing effort to rebuild the U.S. public
health infrastructure that addresses infectious dis-
eases requires a significant investment in modern-
ization and training. Several critical issues are ad-
dressed in the objectives that follow.
The need for adequate physical facilities at
CDC—including insectories and animal facilities,
as well as laboratories and equipment—is addressed
in other documents and plans. Many state and lo-
cal health agencies also require improved physical
facilities.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Define core public health functions and capaci-
ties needed for monitoring the spread of microbes
and responding to infectious disease outbreaks, and
provide personnel in state and large local health
departments with essential equipment and train-
ing. Working with partners in state and local health
departments, CDC has begun a process to identify
the essential functions and core requirements that
a state health department must have to protect its
population against infectious disease threats, as well
as ways to assess how well those functions are per-
formed. For example, each state and large local
health agency must have sufficient diagnostic pro-
ficiency to serve as a local infectious disease refer-
ence laboratory, a role that is likely to become more
important as more laboratory services are priva-
tized or affected by regionalization. Another core
requirement is that adequate epidemiologic staff
are available to investigate outbreaks, and that they
work closely with laboratory staff and have ap-
propriate tools (for example, computer equipment
and compatible software) to facilitate effective in-
teractions. In addition, state and local health de-
partments of all sizes need access to surveillance
information on the populations they serve, access
to laboratory services, and access to additional as-
sistance during emergencies.
CDC has developed specific programs, such as
the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC)
Program (see page 17), to address some core ca-
pacity needs, particularly of state and large local
health departments. However, resources are needed
from all levels of government to ensure that in all
communities there is a strong local public health
presence that serves as the first line of defense against
emerging infectious diseases. State and local health
departments should consider developing emerging
infectious diseases plans that address local priorities.
ii. Strengthen CDC’s capacity to serve as the na-
tional and international reference laboratory for
diagnosis of infectious diseases and for drug-resis-
tance testing. CDC is one of the few institutions in
the world that maintains a comprehensive diagnos-
tic facility with the capacity to detect almost all
known infectious microbes. The staff at CDC in-
cludes experts in bacterial, viral, fungal, rickett-
sial, and parasitic diseases, as well as in diseases
caused by environmental toxins. CDC’s diagnostic
laboratories play an essential and sometimes unique
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role in determining the cause of outbreaks of emerg-
ing infectious diseases. State and local health de-
partments, as well as health ministries in other
countries, depend on CDC’s ability to assist with
difficult diagnoses, especially when the cause of an
outbreak is unknown, or when clinical samples are
so hazardous that they must be handled under the
most stringent biocontainment conditions (see Box
33). CDC also plays a key role in ensuring that an
adequate supply of diagnostic reagents is available
for public health use.
iii. Promote the development and production of
diagnostic and reference reagents for use by public
health laboratories. In past years, CDC maintained
extensive supplies of pathogen-specific antibodies
and other serologic reagents that were standard-
ized and quality-controlled. These reagents were
critical for use in research, diagnosis, and for typ-
ing pathogens during outbreaks. However, supplies
of many reagents are now at dangerously low lev-
els and some have been exhausted. Sustained ef-
forts will be required to ensure that they remain
available.
iv. Work with state health departments to stan-
dardize new diagnostic techniques and facilitate
their use throughout the United States. CDC helped
standardize techniques for fingerprinting strains of
Escherichia coli (see Box 18) and is working on
Box  33 Using Molecular Pathology To Diagnose a Fatal Disease of Unknown Cause
During October 1995, 13 people died of respiratory
failure in a rural area of northwestern Nicaragua, and
hundreds more reported sudden attacks of chills,
headache, and musculoskeletal pain. These symptoms
were compatible with diagnoses of dengue hemorrhagic
fever and dengue fever, two forms of disease caused
by dengue virus, which is endemic to much of Central
and South America. However, all blood tests for dengue
were negative.
The mystery was solved at CDC by pathologists who
use molecular and immunologic probes, such as DNA
sequences and antibodies, to diagnose diseases. The
pathologists tested autopsy tissues for a wide variety of
microbes known to cause lung disease and hemorrhagic
fevers, ruling out numerous viral, bacterial, and parasitic
agents. Eventually, they improvised a new immunohis-
tochemical test for Leptospira, a bacterial pathogen of
animals and humans that in humans usually causes
kidney and liver disease. Although this microorganism is
not generally associated with lung disease, the scien-
tists were aware that in the 1980s respiratory symp-
toms had been reported in cases of leptospirosis in
Korea and China.83,84 The autopsy tissues turned out to
be positive for Leptospira, and the results were later
confirmed by additional assays.
Leptospirosis had not been considered a plausible
diagnosis by attending physicians, who were not
familiar with cases of leptospirosis with prominent
respiratory symptoms. Moreover, the only laboratory test
available at the time that distinguished between past and
current infections—the microscopic agglutination test
(MAT)—required a comparison between acute-phase and
convalescent-phase serum specimens, which were not
available from the patients with pulmonary hemorrhage,
who died within a few days. (The doctors had not
ordered MAT on samples from patients without hemor-
rhage because they did not suspect leptospirosis in those
patients either.)  Without the immunohistochemical test,
which unequivocally demonstrated the presence of
leptospires, the outbreak might have gone undiagnosed
for several months or remained indefinitely as a “mysteri-
ous febrile illness of unknown etiology.”  Instead, the
diagnosis was made in time to save several patients from
dying of respiratory failure by administering intravenous
antibiotics.
At the request of the Ministry of Health of Nicaragua,
CDC provided recommendations for disease prevention
as well as treatment. They advised people to keep
rodents and domestic animals out of their homes and to
avoid water or mud that might be contaminated with
infected animal urine. The recommendations were also
used in a public health education program to prevent
further outbreaks during the next rainy season. CDC is
planning to evaluate additional approaches to preventing
leptospirosis in high risk settings.
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methods for many other organisms, for example,
for detection and characterization of Norwalk-like
viruses and for tracking strains of Bordetella per-
tussis (the causative agent of whooping cough) (see
page 22).
v. Clarify the role of regional facilities in the
United States in specialized diagnosis and strain
typing. For some types of laboratory testing, it may
be impractical to develop diagnostic capacity in
every state or to concentrate all resources at CDC.
For that reason, CDC will continue to investigate
ways to develop regional laboratory capacity for
certain tests. For example, CDC has established the
National Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance
Network, which includes seven regional laborato-
ries that use standardized subtyping methods to
track strains of drug-resistant tuberculosis.
vi.  Assist other U.S. agencies, international orga-
nizations, and other nations in building global ca-
pacity for disease surveillance and response. Like
the United States, many countries are trying to
improve their national capacities for disease sur-
veillance, prevention, and control. CDC will con-
tinue to build on efforts to improve health com-
munications at the international level, including
projects initiated by the World Bank, WHO, the
U.S. Agency for International Development, the
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the
Transatlantic Agenda with the European Union.
CDC will also work to strengthen public health
management training capacity in developing coun-
tries and provide technical assistance in the collec-
tion of vital data (such as data from death certifi-
cates), in epidemiology, and in laboratory sciences (see
Box 34).
Box  34 World Health Organization (WHO) Global Polio Laboratory Network
Ascertaining whether a disease is still present in a given area (and, therefore, that further prevention efforts are needed) is
a critical part of any disease eradication effort (see Box 45). The WHO Global Polio Laboratory Network uses molecular
techniques to determine whether wild-type polio is circulating in areas undergoing eradication efforts. CDC began training
Laboratory Network virologists in 1986, soon after the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) declared its goal of
eradicating polio from the Americas by 1990. CDC will continue to train Network virologists for several more years, as new
methods are developed to meet the stringent surveillance criteria necessary to obtain certification of global polio eradication.
H Special Reference
Laboratory
l Regional Reference
Laboratory
s National Laboratory
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OBJECTIVE III-B.
Improve CDC’s ability to communicate
electronically with state and local health
departments, U.S. quarantine stations,
health care professionals, and others.
The prompt detection of domestic outbreaks de-
pends on the flow of reliable surveillance data from
physicians, hospitals, clinical laboratories, and epi-
demiologists to state and local health departments
and CDC. CDC will continue to play a leadership
role in promoting electronic reporting of labora-
tory data for use in public health surveillance and
rapid response to outbreaks.
Electronic communication will also improve
laboratory diagnosis by linking CDC laboratories
with special diagnostic expertise to state and local
laboratories. This will be especially important dur-
ing outbreak investigations. CDC is also making
use of the Internet to disseminate guidelines and
other information, as well as to provide consulta-
tions and training.
ACTIVITIES:
i.  Ensure that every state, territorial, and large lo-
cal health department has access to compatible
software, hardware, and training required for par-
ticipation in integrated networks for surveillance
and response, as well as for access to guidelines
and other essential resources. Ideally, every state
and local health department should have electronic
access to surveillance information, as well as the
capacity to share information on a regular basis
with other state and local health departments and
with CDC.
ii. Improve management of medical screening data
on refugees and monitor illnesses detected in im-
migrants and travelers at U.S. ports of entry. In
partnership with the Council of State and Territo-
rial Epidemiologists (CSTE), CDC will enhance the
current information system for providing data on
health problems of immigrants and refugees for use
by state health departments, health care providers,
and others who need medical screening informa-
tion. Enhancements will include a follow-up pro-
gram to monitor the outcome of selected diseases
identified in immigrants and refugees.
OBJECTIVE III-C.
Enhance the nation’s capacity to respond to
complex infectious disease threats in the
United States and internationally, including
outbreaks that may result from bioterrorism.
A strong and flexible public health infrastructure
is the best defense against any disease outbreak,
including a pandemic or a terrorist attack. Many
of the objectives and activities in this plan help build
such an infrastructure.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Work with state and local health departments,
other federal agencies, organizations of first re-
sponders (such as firemen and emergency medical
workers), and international partners to develop
plans for responding to complex outbreaks, includ-
ing those caused by the deliberate release of toxins
or infectious organisms. A national plan has been
developed to respond to an influenza pandemic (see
Box 35), and additional efforts are needed to pre-
pare for other potentially devastating outbreaks.
These plans need to address issues that range from
establishing secure lines for communication to en-
suring that first responders know how to protect
themselves from deadly agents.
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ii.   Enhance national “surge” capacity for respond-
ing to outbreaks of unusual size, duration, and se-
verity. In recent years, CDC and other organiza-
tions have responded to increasing numbers of
infectious disease emergencies that require large
numbers of personnel over long periods of time
(such as the outbreaks of Ebola hemorrhagic fever
in Africa and the multistate outbreaks of cyclospor-
iasis in the United States). CDC plans to imple-
ment the recommendations developed through a
planning process that include
• Establishing emergency mechanisms that provide
CDC with extra resources, including extra per-
sonnel, during complex outbreaks.
• Maintaining CDC’s expertise in infectious dis-
eases, including rare diseases that have the ca-
pacity to cause high rates of illness and death.
• Ensuring that CDC has adequate scientific and
support staff (in both numbers and expertise)
for responding to outbreaks.
• Ensuring that emergency procurement proce-
dures are in place and that medical supplies and
field equipment are ready for immediate ship-
ment at all times.
• Establishing a computer system dedicated to gath-
ering epidemiologic and laboratory data during
outbreaks. This database should be accessible to
all those involved in the outbreak response.
In the event of a terrorist attack, some additional
resources and procedures may be required. For
example, expertise may be needed in the diagnosis
and treatment of certain diseases rarely seen in the
United States (for example, anthrax, botulism, and
brucellosis) that might be caused by biological
weapons. CDC must also be prepared to mobilize
extra staff; coordinate closely with federal security
agencies; and procure specialized diagnostic tests,
drugs, and vaccines.
State and local health departments also need
surge capacity for outbreaks. Mechanisms for
Box  35 The National Plan for Pandemic
Influenza
New strains of influenza viruses can emerge unpre-
dictably and spread rapidly and pervasively through
susceptible populations, sometimes causing
pandemics (worldwide epidemics). This is due in
large part to two features of the influenza virus: its
ability to exchange genetic information between
strains and its ability to occasionally “jump” species
barriers between mammalian and avian hosts.
Experts agree that future pandemics of influenza
are likely, if not inevitable. In the United States alone,
preliminary estimates indicate that an influenza
pandemic would cause between 88,000–227,000
deaths and that the economic impact would range
from $71–$166 billion.85 The sudden and unpredict-
able emergence of pandemic influenza (see Box 1),
and its potential to cause severe health and social
consequences, are reasons why we need a national
plan to protect the public against pandemic influenza.
CDC is an active member of the interagency
Group on Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and
Emergency Response (GrIPPE), which developed the
national influenza plan. If an influenza pandemic
occurs, CDC’s “mission control” responsibilities
would include
• Confirming the cause and scope of the threat.
• Establishing a communication network for prompt
dissemination of information to public health offi-
cials, health care providers, and the general public.
• Developing and testing candidate vaccines.
• Implementing vaccine purchase and distribution.
• Monitoring adverse events after vaccination.
• Disseminating information and coordinating
education campaigns through the national media.
• Communicating and coordinating activities with
other countries.
• Evaluating the effectiveness of the national effort.
In late 1997, a new and virulent strain of influenza
(strain H5N1) was detected in Hong Kong through the
World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) global influenza
surveillance network. Because this strain—which nor-
mally infects birds—had never before been known to
infect humans, a worldwide alert was issued through
WHO and other national and international networks,
and many of the activities described in the national
influenza plan, including enhanced surveillance and a
search for candidate vaccines, were initiated.
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sharing state and federal staff and other resources
during emergencies will be evaluated.
iii.  Assist FDA, WHO, private industry, other gov-
ernments, and international organizations to en-
sure that emergency medical supplies, including
drugs, vaccines, diagnostics, and antisera, are
available during outbreaks. CDC is working with
FDA and the CISET Emerging Infectious Disease
Task Force to engage WHO and the U.S. pharma-
ceutical industry in developing a procedures
manual for obtaining medical supplies during
health  emergencies. Through WHO, pharmaceu-
tical companies from other nations will also par-
ticipate in this effort.
OBJECTIVE III-D.
Provide training opportunities in infectious
disease epidemiology and diagnosis in the
United States and throughout the world.
CDC’s 1994 plan emphasized the need for addi-
tional training opportunities to ensure that we are
well-prepared to respond to emerging infectious
disease threats. Between 1994 and 1997, CDC be-
gan to identify and fill some of those gaps in train-
ing (see the Appendix), but more remains to be done.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Ensure the continued training of epidemiolo-
gists in problems related to emerging infectious
diseases. Graduates of programs such as CDC’s
Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) perform key
roles in federal government, in state and local
health departments, and in health care settings.
Today’s epidemiologists must be trained in the use
of modern molecular, statistical, and geographi-
cal tools.
ii.  Increase the number of laboratory scientists
trained in infectious diseases through the Emerg-
ing Infectious Diseases (EID) Laboratory Fellow-
ship Program and add a track for international stu-
dents. The EID Laboratory Fellowship Program
trains microbiologists in public health approaches
to diagnosis and molecular epidemiology. Its goal
is to train laboratory scientists to become leaders
in public health laboratories, especially at the state
and local levels.
iii.  Maintain and expand other CDC training pro-
grams in emerging infectious diseases and develop
new programs as needed. These include the CDC
Summer Fellows Program for infectious diseases,
which provides opportunities to minority students
in historically black colleges and universities
(HBCU), Hispanic-serving health professions
schools (HSHPS), and American Indian and Alaska
Native medical students. Other CDC programs in-
clude the Public Health Summer Fellows and Project
Imhotep, which provide additional opportunities
for HBCU and HSHPS students. CDC also pro-
vides research training through postdoctoral fellow-
ships awarded by the American Society for Micro-
biology. In addition, CDC provides distance learn-
ing opportunities to infectious disease specialists
and public health practitioners through the Public
Health Training Network and the National Labo-
ratory Training Network.
CDC will provide additional opportunities for
professional training through preventive medicine
residencies, prevention effectiveness internships,
public health informatics fellowships, genetics fel-
lowships, public health prevention specialist fellow-
ships, and programs in such disciplines as behav-
ioral sciences and health education.
iv.  Help medical and public health professionals
keep up to date with new tools, techniques, and
issues. This includes
• Educating and training clinical laboratorians in
the diagnosis of emerging pathogens.
• Working with U.S. schools of public health, nurs-
ing, medicine, and veterinary sciences to update
curricula to include courses on the prevention
and control of emerging infectious diseases.
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• Helping to ensure coverage of emerging infec-
tious diseases in continuing medical education
efforts and other training for professionals.
• Incorporating training for local and state health
department personnel into CDC-supported pro-
grams, such as the Emerging Infections Programs.
v.  Expand CDC’s efforts to train counterparts in
developing countries in the use of  epidemiologic
and laboratory methods for combating emerging
infectious diseases. Some of these efforts involve
formal programs, like CDC’s Field Epidemiology
Training Programs (FETPs), which are based in
15 countries throughout the world, and CDC’s
Sustainable Management Development Program,
which has graduates in 39 countries. The goal of
the FETPs is to develop highly trained in-country
epidemiologists who can address local public health
problems. Another formal program is the joint
CDC-NIH effort to provide epidemiologic train-
ing at NIH-sponsored emerging infections research
programs overseas. CDC also participates in train-
ing programs sponsored by nongovernmental or-
ganizations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation’s
Schools of Public Health Without Walls.
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G O A L   I V :    P R E V E N T I O N   A N D   C O N T R O L
Ensure prompt implementation of prevention strategies and enhance communicationof public health information about emerging diseases.
OBJECTIVE IV-A.
Implement, support, and evaluate
programs for the prevention and control
of emerging infectious diseases.
Preventing emerging infectious diseases is a
multidisciplinary and multifaceted endeavor.
It requires the resources and expertise of many
groups of people in both the public and pri-
vate sectors.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Expand existing community-based control
programs. CDC works with many partners to
conduct broad-based community programs for
controlling certain diseases, such as dengue
fever and dengue hemorrhagic fever in Puerto
Rico (see Box 36) and malaria in Kenya and
other African nations. CDC is also working
to expand domestic HIV prevention efforts
through the HIV Prevention Community Plan-
ning Project, which targets public resources
toward programs for groups at highest risk of
HIV infection and ensures that HIV preven-
tion activities reflect the needs and preferences
of local communities. Other programs sup-
ported by CDC focus on specific problems in
more limited settings, such as control of infec-
tious diseases in hospitals.
Box  36 Prevention and Control of Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever
Dengue (or “break-bone”) fever is an acute illness
characterized by the abrupt onset of fever, rash, headache,
and pain in the muscles, joints, and eyes. Although
dengue epidemics can be explosive, fatalities are rare,
except when the illness develops into dengue hemor-
rhagic fever (DHF), which can lead to shock and death.
After many years of infrequent dengue outbreaks in the
Americas, there has been a dramatic resurgence of
epidemic dengue fever and, for the first time, the
emergence of DHF. The increased incidence of dengue
and the emergence of DHF is associated with the
reinfestation of most Latin American countries by Aedes
aegypti, the principal mosquito vector of dengue viruses.86
This mosquito was eradicated from most of the American
tropics in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, as part of the
effort to prevent urban epidemics of yellow fever.
A program for prevention and control of epidemic
dengue and DHF in Puerto Rico was begun in 1985. The
program had five components: 1) active, laboratory-based
surveillance, 2) emergency vector control, 3) education of
the medical community, 4) emergency hospitalization, and
5) community-based mosquito control. The program was
developed in partnership with the Puerto Rico Department
of Health and Rotary International and emphasized
community participation and community ownership.
The program on dengue has had a global impact. It has
been used as a model to develop the Pan American Health
Organization’s Dengue and Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever in
the Americas: Guidelines for Prevention and Control and
the WHO Global Strategy for Prevention and Control of
Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever. CDC has recently received a
grant from the Foundation of Rotary International to initiate
pilot dengue prevention projects in the Philippines and
Colombia. If successful, the pilot projects may be the first
component of a Rotary-supported global program on
prevention and control of dengue and DHF.
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ii.  Develop and support new community-based
demonstration programs in the target areas. CDC
will continue to develop community-based dem-
onstration projects and evaluate their sustainability.
In the United States, new demonstration projects
would be especially helpful in the following areas:
• Programs to prevent the development and spread
of antimicrobial resistance.
• Programs to promote the prevention of
foodborne and waterborne diseases.
• Integrated pest management to prevent
vectorborne diseases.
• Health education and prenatal care programs
to prevent perinatal infections.
• Programs to prevent HIV transmission through
treatment and prevention of other sexually trans-
mitted diseases
iii. Evaluate the impact and cost-effectiveness of
alternative approaches to reducing infectious dis-
eases. For example, CDC will evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of different ways to reduce the devel-
opment and spread of antimicrobial resistance, re-
spond to outbreaks of diseases like group A men-
ingococcal infection, improve vaccination rates, and
vaccinate people against Lyme disease. Health inter-
ventions involving animals and the environment also
need assessment. CDC will identify the most cost-
effective approaches for controlling rabies in ani-
mals and reducing food contamination on farms.
iv.   Increase the use of vaccines to prevent and con-
trol emerging infectious diseases (see Box 37).
Through the Vaccines for Children Program and
other efforts, CDC is working to ensure that all
U.S. children get routine childhood vaccinations.
CDC is also helping to implement the Adult Im-
munization Action Plan, which, among other pri-
orities, aims to increase vaccine coverage among
adults at risk for influenza and pneumococcal
pneumonia—major causes of hospitalization and
death among the elderly and people with chronic
lung disease. Other groups targeted for vaccina-
Box  37 Diphtheria in the United States
A number of diseases have become extremely rare in
the United States because of universal vaccination
among children and adults. One example is diphtheria,
a bacterial infection characterized by the development
of a membrane in the throat that can sometimes
obstruct the airway and cause the infected person to
suffocate. In the prevaccine era, diphtheria was a
major killer of children in both industrialized and
agrarian countries. The most severe cases were
caused by bacterial strains that secrete a toxin that
damages heart muscle and nervous tissue.
Although only a few cases of diphtheria are
reported annually, CDC continues to conduct surveil-
lance for diphtheria and other vaccine-preventable
illnesses, to guard against the ever-present possibility
of their reemergence. Whenever a new case of
diphtheria is detected in the United States, CDC and
its collaborators isolate the causative organism and use
molecular fingerprinting to trace its origin. An isolated
case of diphtheria might be imported from a country
that lacks an effective vaccination program (as did
Russia and the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union in the early 1990s). Or it might occur
when a new strain of bacteria evolves that is unaf-
fected by the diphtheria vaccine now in use.
Most of the diphtheria cases reported in the United
States since 1988 have been imported from other
countries, suggesting that endemic strains of diphthe-
ria were disappearing from North America. However,
in 1996, researchers isolated strains of toxigenic
Corynebacterium diphtheriae from throat swabs and
blood samples obtained from several members of a
small community in South Dakota
who had mild or asymptomatic infections. Molecular
analysis of the bacterial strains suggested that they
were endemic, rather than imported.87 Similar investi-
gations in Canada revealed the persistent circulation
of toxigenic strains of diphtheria in other small
communities.88
CDC is investigating why C. diphtheriae is still
present in the South Dakota community. Although the
resurgence may be due to a low local rate of vaccina-
tion, it is also possible that subclinical foci of disease
exist in many other U.S. communities. In view of these
uncertainties—and the resurgence of diphtheria in
Russia and Eastern Europe—CDC recommends that all
Americans receive a diphtheria booster every 10 years
to prolong the beneficial effects of the vaccine
administered in childhood.
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tion include health care workers who are at risk
for contracting hepatitis B and travelers who are
at risk for diseases like hepatitis A or yellow fever.
v.  Work with health care providers, hospitals, man-
aged care organizations, and others to improve
patient outcomes related to infectious diseases.
CDC will promote the incorporation of perfor-
mance indicators that measure the effectiveness of
disease control measures into hospital and man-
aged care organization reporting systems (for ex-
ample, the Health Plan Employer Data and Infor-
mation Set [HEDIS] and the Indicator Monitoring
System [IMS]). Feedback from such indicators can
be used to modify health care practices. CDC will
also encourage the use of hospital-based computer
systems to provide physicians with feedback on
the success or failure of the antibiotic treatments
they administer.
vi.  Work with private industry, government agen-
cies, and others to develop systems that promote
prompt identification of infectious disease prob-
lems and rapid implementation of control mea-
sures. Whenever there are safe and cost-effective
steps consumers can take to protect themselves
from a contaminated product implicated in an
outbreak, CDC must ensure public notification.
This often involves working with other federal
agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administra-
tion and the Environmental Protection Agency,
state and local health departments, private indus-
try, consumer groups, and others. CDC will help
develop electronic networks to disseminate infor-
mation on outbreaks due to contaminated health
care-related products (for example, blood prod-
ucts, like intravenous albumin). In addition, CDC
will work with private industry to improve record
keeping on commercial food distribution so that
shipments of contaminated food can be traced back
to their sources.
vii.  Work with personnel at U.S. ports of entry
and with the travel industry to prevent the impor-
tation of infectious diseases and reduce illness in
U.S. travelers when they are abroad and after they
return home. CDC is responsible for identifying ill
passengers on airplanes and cruise ships entering
the United States, in collaboration with airplane
and ships’ crews. Medical staff at ports of entry
must be provided with up-to-date case definitions
for syndromes and specific diseases they need to
be alert for, and airport personnel must have con-
tingency plans for dealing with highly contagious
international passengers. CDC must also continue
to work with the travel industry to ensure that trav-
elers from the United States take appropriate pre-
cautions when they visit other parts of the world.
OBJECTIVE IV-B.
Develop, evaluate, and promote strategies
to help health care providers and other
individuals change behaviors that facilitate
disease transmission.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Work with other organizations to communicate
disease prevention information to professionals and
the public. CDC will continue to serve as a source
of scientific information on emerging infectious
diseases (see Boxes 38–40). It will make increased
use of the Internet to ensure that this information
is widely disseminated.
The importance of partners in developing and
disseminating public health information is illus-
trated in a new CDC effort to address the problem
of hepatitis C, an emerging infectious disease that
affects an estimated 3.9 million persons in the
United States. This campaign will involve profes-
sional organizations, private industry, public health
agencies, and many others. Key messages include
the following: those at risk need to be tested and
counseled and those infected need appropriate
medical evaluation and treatment.
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ii.  Work with other organizations to develop and
implement programs to improve public health
practices in the target areas. Human behaviors are
major factors in the spread of infectious diseases.
CDC will emphasize programs that change behav-
iors by influencing individuals (for example, by
promoting hand washing) and organizations (for
example, by promoting formulary restrictions in
hospitals and managed care organizations to re-
duce the use of  antimicrobial drugs). In many
cases, a combination of approaches will be em-
ployed.
Box  39 Using the Internet To Help Control
an Outbreak of Hantavirus Pulmonary
Syndrome
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS), which is
carried by rodents, is a lung disease that was first
identified during a 1993 outbreak in the southwestern
United States. People who become infected often die
within days because of severe pulmonary hemorrhage.
To prevent and control future outbreaks, CDC has
developed educational materials that use text, images,
animation, and video to explain how the disease can
be treated and how individuals can avoid infection.
These materials are available on CDC’s Internet
website on a page called “All About Hantavirus”
(www.CDC.gov/ncidod/diseases/hanta/hps/index.htm).
In 1997, during an HPS outbreak in Chile, local
health care workers used information from this
website to mount a multimedia prevention campaign.
They designed posters and radio and TV announce-
ments that explained how people could protect
themselves and their families from HPS. The an-
nouncements offered advice on how to keep rodents
out of homes and work places and described special
precautions for workers who are regularly exposed to
rodents. The announcements also urged people in the
affected area who experienced flulike symptoms to
get immediate medical attention.
By the time an epidemiologic team from CDC
arrived in the outbreak area, the campaign was already
well under way. Knowing that the public had access to
prevention information, the CDC team was able to
concentrate its efforts on the epidemiologic investiga-
tion. Although the number of HPS cases that were
avoided by preventive action cannot be counted, it is
likely that many lives were saved by the rapid actions
of the Chileans.
Box  38 The EID Journal
Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID), a peer-reviewed
journal, was established in January 1995 to enhance
communication of public health information about
emerging infections among professionals in infectious
diseases and related sciences. The quarterly journal
tracks disease trends, analyzes new and reemerging
infectious diseases, and disseminates information
around the world. In May 1997, the journal’s home
page was accessed over 18,000 times. More than
7,000 subscribers receive the journal by e-mail, and the
print version is distributed to 19,000 public health pro-
fessionals in the United States and abroad. A Spanish
translation of the journal is also available electronically.
EID is indexed in Index Medicus/Medline, Current
Contents, and other electronic databases.
iii.  Develop, implement, and evaluate disease pre-
vention guidelines that can be used by the public,
health care providers, and health care systems. One
way in which CDC furthers its mission is by pro-
viding guidelines on how to prevent specific dis-
eases or disease problems (see Boxes 40 and 41).
The development of disease prevention guidelines
is a multistep process that begins with field research
on risk factors, transmission patterns, and the
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effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of different pre-
vention strategies.
In developing guidelines, CDC relies on the ex-
pertise and experience of many different groups and
integrates many different kinds of data into easily
understood documents that guide clinical and pub-
lic health practice. Once completed, prevention
guidelines are implemented in partnership with
physicians, professional societies, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, and others. Thereafter, field
research is used to confirm that the guidelines are
effective in reducing the incidence of disease. Guide-
lines are updated periodically to incorporate new
information as it becomes available.
CDC is developing new methods for disseminat-
ing guidelines. For example, CDC has published
CDC Prevention Guidelines: A Guide to Action89
in CD-ROM format. CDC will make a special
effort to work with managed care organizations to
Box  40 Preventing Infection in
Immunocompromised People
Through Dissemination of
Information
CDC helps people who have impaired immune
systems avoid infection by providing them and their
health care providers with up-to-date information on
disease prevention. For example, pamphlets
developed by CDC explain how HIV/AIDS patients
can lessen their risk of developing Pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia by taking prophylactic medications
and avoid contracting zoonotic infections from pets.
CDC has also developed educational material on
the prevention of infection due to the waterborne
parasite Cryptosporidium, which may cause life-
threatening intestinal problems in people with
impaired immune systems. CDC recommends that
people with HIV/AIDS who wish to reduce their risk
consider boiling or filtering their tap water or using
bottled water, and use caution when in contact with
recreational water (for example, swimming pools and
water parks). CDC is also working with manufactur-
ers and the Food and Drug Administration to improve
labeling so that consumers can identify filters,
bottled water, and other products that can help
reduce their risk of contracting cryptosporidiosis.
adapt, implement, and assess the effectiveness of
these guidelines. In addition, CDC is supporting
an independent, nonfederal task force that is de-
veloping a Guide to Community Preventive Ser-
vices, which will provide recommendations on
population-based interventions and methods for
their delivery based on the best available evidence.
Over the next 5 years, guidelines will be devel-
oped for such topics as the prevention of opportu-
nistic infections in bone marrow transplant recipi-
ents, and will be updated in such areas as infection
control in hospitals and health care settings, re-
duction of occupational exposure to infectious
agents in health care settings, and medical screen-
ing of immigrants and refugees. When possible, new
guidelines will be integrated into existing ones so
that they are easier to implement. When appropri-
ate, they will be disseminated and updated via the
Internet (in addition to other channels). For ex-
ample, guidelines already exist for many diseases
that affect pregnant women and newborns. Inte-
grating new information on the prevention of such
Box  41 USPHS/IDSA Guidelines for the
Prevention of Opportunistic Infections
in Persons Infected with HIV
CDC issued the USPHS/IDSA Guidelines for the
Prevention of Opportunistic Infections in Persons
Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus in 1995,
in association with other U.S. Public Health Service
(USPHS) agencies, the Infectious Diseases Society of
America (IDSA), and numerous other organizations,
health care providers, and patient advocates. The
guidelines address 17 categories of opportunistic
infections. They include information on how to prevent
exposure to specific opportunistic pathogens, how to
use chemoprophylaxis or vaccination to prevent
disease, and how to prevent disease recurrence.
They also address issues of concern to HIV-infected
children and pregnant women.
The USPHS/IDSA guidelines were endorsed by
numerous organizations and disseminated widely,
providing a new standard of care for HIV-infected
people. The guidelines were updated and republished
in 1997.
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diseases as group B streptococcal disease into ex-
isting guidelines will make it easier for practition-
ers to take an integrated approach to prevention.
iv.  Work with school boards, departments of edu-
cation, and others to incorporate information
about prevention of infectious diseases into elemen-
tary and secondary school education. The agree-
ment described on page 56 to address foodborne
diseases involves the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion, and plans are being developed to provide
health information to adolescents through broad
educational programs.
Box  42 HICPAC Guidelines
The Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory
Committee (HICPAC) was established by CDC in
1991. Its publications represent the official recommen-
dations of CDC and the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services on hospital infection control practices
and strategies for the surveillance, prevention, and
control of hospital-acquired infections.
HICPAC has issued guidelines to help health care
providers improve the quality of their services. These
include
• Immunization of Health-Care Workers (issued
jointly with the Advisory Committee on Immuniza-
tion Practices) (1997)
• Guidelines for Infection Control in Healthcare
Personnel (1997)
• Guidelines for Prevention of Intravascular Device-
Related Infections (1996)
• Guidelines for Isolation Precautions in Hospitals
(1996)
• Recommendations for Preventing the Spread of
Vancomycin Resistance (1995)
• Guidelines for Prevention of Nosocomial Pneumo-
nia (1994)
OBJECTIVE IV-C.
Support and promote disease control and
prevention internationally.
 CDC is working with organizations in the United
States and throughout the world to provide lead-
ership and technical assistance for the global pre-
vention and control of emerging infectious diseases.
Some of this work is conducted through the CISET
Emerging Infectious Disease Task Force.
ACTIVITIES:
i. Work with foreign governments, WHO, the
U.S.–European Union Task Force on Communi-
cable Diseases, other international partners, and
the CISET Emerging Infectious Disease Task Force
to promote global programs for the prevention and
control of infectious diseases. CDC will continue
its efforts to establish systematic antimicrobial
resistance monitoring throughout the world to
support control efforts and will help draft a set of
international standards for antibiotic resistance
monitoring. CDC will also train foreign nationals
and help ensure that they have adequate equipment
and reagents for monitoring drug-resistant patho-
gens. CDC will continue to support quality assur-
ance efforts in laboratories that participate in
WHO’s WHONET surveillance system and its pro-
gram for Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring
(ARM), as well as continue to participate in WHO’s
ongoing surveillance project for drug-resistant
tuberculosis.
CDC will continue to contribute to global ef-
forts to eradicate polio and other diseases that may
soon be slated for eradication or elimination (see
page 49) and to respond to diseases and outbreaks
of international concern. CDC will also continue
to work with WHO’s Expanded Program on Im-
munization (EPI) to conduct surveillance for vac-
cine-preventable diseases and will help assess the
possibility of integrating selected vaccines (such as
yellow fever and Japanese encephalitis) into na-
tional and regional components of  EPI. Vaccines
against Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) have
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almost eliminated this cause of meningitis in
industrialized countries, and CDC is working with
other partners (including WHO, the U.S. Agency
for International Development [USAID], and the
Children’s Vaccine Initiative) to promote childhood
vaccination against Hib in developing countries.
ii. Provide technical assistance and transfer cost-
effective technologies to other countries, using gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental channels. For ex-
ample, CDC is helping address blood safety in
Kenya and Guatemala (focusing on HIV and
Chagas’ disease, respectively) and is promoting in-
expensive environmental control measures to pre-
vent nosocomial tuberculosis transmission in coun-
tries with a high prevalence of HIV infection. At
its field site in Botswana, CDC is learning how to
improve tuberculosis control strategies in commu-
nities with high HIV prevalence. Lessons learned
are being shared with other African countries. CDC
is also developing diagnostic reference protocols
suitable for use in developing countries that have
limited resources. CDC will continue to work with
WHO and others to develop disease control guide-
lines for use in developing countries where diag-
noses are difficult to confirm because of the lack
of  laboratory facilities.
iii. Participate in bilateral and multilateral initia-
tives to improve global infectious disease preven-
tion and control. Over the past few years, several
bilateral and multilateral groups have put emerg-
ing infectious diseases on their agendas (see Box
43). CDC staff will continue to participate in in-
teragency delegations that promote international
action to combat emerging infectious diseases.
iv. Work with WHO and other partners to com-
plete the revision of International Health Regula-
tions. The International Health Regulations require
reporting of outbreaks of certain diseases (such as
plague, yellow fever, and cholera) that require in-
ternational attention because they can rapidly
spread from country to country. The next revision
of the regulations is proposed to emphasize disease
syndrome reporting rather than specific diseases.
v. Work with developing countries to sustain health
care improvements and surveillance efforts after
outbreaks. In addition to helping to control out-
breaks, CDC provides affected populations with
tools to address infectious disease problems that
may arise in the future. This often involves main-
taining a relationship with health authorities and
medical professionals in the affected area. For ex-
ample, since the Ebola fever outbreak in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo in May 1995, CDC rep-
resentatives have helped the local community main-
tain improvements in hospital infrastructure and
hospital nursing practices. In coordination with
WHO, they have remained involved in ongoing
efforts to develop long-term surveillance of hem-
orrhagic fever outbreaks in the region (see Box 44).
After the 1994 plague outbreak in India, CDC sci-
entists participated in WHO-supported courses to
train Indian health professionals in the diagnosis,
epidemiology, and microbiology of plague.
Box  43 International Agendas That Address
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Emerging infectious diseases are a topic of discussion
at many high-level international meetings. Many
governments view emerging infections as an
economic issue as well as a public health issue,
because healthy people are more productive and more
able to contribute to their countries’ economies.
Moreover, outbreaks can impede economic develop-
ment by interfering with tourism and trade.
Emerging infectious diseases are on the agenda
of the
• Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
• Common Agenda with Japan
• U.S.-Russia Commission on Economic and
Technological Cooperation
• U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission
• Group of Eight Industrialized Nations
• Transatlantic Agenda with the European Union
• U.S.-Mexico Binational Agreement
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vi.  Continue to work toward the global eradication
of polio and Guinea worm disease and the eradica-
tion or elimination of other infectious diseases. The
effort to eradicate smallpox is perhaps the single best
example of using global cooperation to address a
public health problem. Its success stimulated other
efforts to eliminate infectious diseases. Projects to
eradicate polio and Guinea worm disease are under
way (see Box 45), and global momentum is building
to eradicate measles, a leading cause of death in
developing countries. Other diseases that may be
proposed for future eradication programs in-
clude Haemophilus influenzae type b, filariasis,
onchocerchiasis, rubella, and hepatitis B.
Box  44 Skin Biopsy Surveillance for Ebola
A 1995 outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever—one of
the deadliest viral diseases known—in and around
the city of Kikwit in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (then Zaire) did not receive international
attention until several months had passed and
several hospital workers died (see also Box 5). Part
of the delay was caused by difficulty in diagnosing
Ebola fever, which requires immediate testing of
highly infectious tissues.
While the outbreak was still in progress, scien-
tists at CDC began developing a method for the
detection of Ebola virus antigens in formalin-treated
skin specimens from fatal cases. Formalin fixing
renders specimens noninfectious, and the fixed skin
does not require immediate testing, cold storage, or
special shipping procedures. After the outbreak was
over, CDC developed Ebola virus surveillance kits to
enable health workers to safely obtain and fix skin
necropsy samples. The fixed specimens could then
be shipped to CDC for testing. The kits were
provided to health care facilities in the Kikwit area.
Using a manual developed at CDC, the local health
workers were trained to identify suspected Ebola
cases and to isolate patients suffering from hemor-
rhagic fevers.
CDC is distributing the training manuals and test
kits widely, as well as developing new assays for the
diagnosis of other hemorrhagic fevers. Prompt
diagnosis of hemorrhagic fevers in Africa will help
provide early warning of outbreaks and allow control
measures to be instituted promptly.
Box  45 Eradication Efforts
Polio Eradication
The effort to eradicate polio in the Americas, which was
initiated by the Pan American Health Organization in
1985, led to the elimination of polio in the Western
Hemisphere by 1991. Since 1988, the global effort has
been led by WHO, in partnership with an international
coalition that includes CDC, Rotary International, the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the
governments of many countries. The Americas were
certified by WHO as polio-free in 1994. By 1996, only
3,977 cases of polio were detected worldwide, which is
an 89% decrease since the effort began.90 Polio is
targeted for worldwide eradication by the year 2000.
CDC has contributed to the eradication campaign by
helping plan the global strategy; developing laboratory
techniques for detecting and characterizing vaccine and
wild-type strains of poliovirus; improving surveillance
and vaccine delivery; training health workers (including
laboratorians and epidemiologists); supporting the WHO
Global Polio Laboratory Network (see Box 34); and
providing vaccines and technical advice to national and
regional eradication programs.
Guinea Worm Disease Eradication
The eradication of Guinea worm disease (also called
dracunculiasis) depends mainly on environmental and
behavioral interventions that reduce exposure to
contaminated water, rather than on vaccination. The
Guinea Worm Eradication Program has been so
successful that the illness has been referred to as a
“submerging” disease. At the current rate of progress,
dracunculiasis may be eliminated before polio. The
leaders of this effort include the Carter Center’s Global
2000 Program, UNICEF, WHO, and CDC.
CDC became formally involved in the eradication
effort in 1984—after several years of providing assis-
tance—when a WHO Collaborating Center for Research,
Training, and Eradication of Guinea Worm was estab-
lished at CDC’s National Center for Infectious Diseases.
CDC mapped the distribution of dracunculiasis and
conducted research to improve its diagnosis, treatment,
control, and prevention. Since 1986, the number of
cases of Guinea worm has decreased by 95%.91.92
CDC continues to send expert consultants to endemic
countries to promote training and to provide support to
national eradication programs.
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The underserved areas of developing countries that
present the greatest challenges for disease eradica-
tion are often the same areas where surveillance
and response to emerging diseases are most diffi-
cult. Therefore, infrastructure developed for dis-
ease eradication programs is an extremely impor-
tant byproduct of disease eradication campaigns.
Eradication programs provide valuable training op-
portunities for epidemiologists, public health ad-
visors, and village health workers. Furthermore,
as diseases are conquered, the resources used to
address them can be applied to new threats.
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Achievement of the objectives described inthis plan will improve our ability to un-derstand, detect, control, and prevent
infectious diseases. The outcome will be a stron-
ger, more flexible U.S. public health infrastructure
well-prepared to respond to well-known disease
problems and to address the unexpected, whether
it be an influenza pandemic, a disease caused by
an unknown organism, or a bioterrorist attack.
Implementation of this plan will produce the fol-
lowing results:
• A nationwide network for surveillance and re-
sponse will ensure the prompt identification of
emerging infectious diseases. State and local
health departments will have the equipment and
trained personnel needed to provide the front
line public health response to infectious disease
threats.
• Intensive population-based surveillance and re-
search programs in at least 10 areas of the United
States will generate data to identify new threats
to public health and help guide responses to
emerging infectious diseases.
• Health departments will rapidly detect and in-
vestigate outbreaks of foodborne illnesses us-
ing sophisticated epidemiologic and laboratory
techniques. Early detection will facilitate the
rapid implementation of control measures and
the prevention of illness and death.
• Countries in all regions of the world will par-
ticipate in a global system for surveillance and
response that includes surveillance for infectious
agents that are resistant to antimicrobial drugs.
This effort will be undertaken in partnership
with the World Health Organization and orga-
nizations and agencies around the world.
A N T I C I P A T E D   O U T C O M E S
• Enhancement of the public health infrastructure
will help prepare the United States to respond
to bioterrorist incidents.
• Improved diagnostic testing methods will be
developed for new, reemerging, and drug-resis-
tant pathogens.
• A better understanding of risk factors for the
development of infection and disease will pro-
vide new opportunities for disease prevention.
• A better understanding of relationships between
infectious agents and some chronic diseases will
lead to new strategies for preventing and treat-
ing chronic diseases.
• New strategies will be designed to reduce insect
vector populations and control animal popula-
tions that serve as reservoirs for human diseases.
• Diagnostic and reference reagents will be avail-
able for use by public health laboratories. CDC
will have enhanced capacity to serve as the na-
tional reference center for diagnosis of infectious
diseases and for drug-resistance testing.
• The next generation of epidemiologists and
laboratorians will be trained and prepared to re-
spond to emerging infectious disease threats.
• Implementation of prevention guidelines will
result in decreased death and disability due to
emerging infectious diseases.
• Cooperative efforts among managed care organi-
zations, health care facilities, state and local health
departments, and CDC will improve treatment and
prevention of infectious diseases.
• Deaths from vaccine-preventable diseases will be
significantly reduced in the United States and
abroad.
• Community-based demonstration programs will
help identify cost-effective approaches to ad-
dressing emerging infectious disease problems.
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A P P E N D I X
Implementation of
High Priority Activities  from
Addressing Emerging
Infectious Disease Threats:
A Prevention Strategy for the
United States
1994–1997
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In the 1994 plan, Addressing Emerging Infec-tious Disease Threats: A Prevention Strategyfor the United States, CDC outlined 10 prior-
ity activities for the first years of the effort to
combat emerging infectious diseases. This appen-
dix describes the progress made in implementing
those 10 activities. Additional CDC achievements
in the area of emerging infectious diseases have been
summarized elsewhere.93,94
Goal I: Surveillance and Response
Detect, investigate, and monitor emerging pathogens,
the diseases they cause, and the factors influencing
their emergence.
PRIORITY I:
Strengthen notifiable disease surveillance at the
state and local levels.
Implementation:
1995 Created the Epidemiologic and Laboratory
Capacity (ELC) Cooperative Agreement
Program to help states and large local and
territorial health departments develop the
core capacity to meet infectious disease
threats (see page 17).
1995 Entered into ELC agreements with Colo-
rado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Los Ange-
les County, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York City, Washington State, and West
Virginia.
1996 Entered into ELC agreements with Hawaii,
Louisiana, Maine, New York State, and
Pennsylvania.
1997 Entered into ELC agreements with Illinois,
Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
and Wisconsin.
1997 Entered into a cooperative agreement with
the Council of State and Territorial Epidemi-
ologists (CSTE) to enhance state health de-
partments’ capacities to respond to outbreaks
of unusual size, duration, or severity.
PRIORITY 2:
Establish two physician-based sentinel surveillance
networks to detect and monitor emerging diseases,
such as unexplained adult respiratory distress syn-
drome, multidrug-resistant pneumococcal disease,
and childhood illnesses characterized by fever and
rash.
Implementation:
1995 Established the Emergency Department
Sentinel Network for Emerging Infections
(EMERGEncy ID NET) (see page 19). The
network is coordinated by the Olive View-
UCLA Education and Research Institute.
1996 Established the Infectious Disease Society
of America Emerging Infections Network
(IDSA EIN), which includes over 500 in-
fectious disease specialists practicing in 47
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico (see page 19). This network is coor-
dinated by the Veterans Administration
Medical Center in Portland, Oregon.
1996 Established the Sentinel Network of Travel
Medicine Clinics (GeoSentinel), in collabo-
ration with the International Society of
Travel Medicine (see page 19). GeoSentinel
is composed of 22 travel medicine clinics,
located in the United States and other coun-
tries.
1996– Established seven to eight sentinel surveil-
1997 lance projects per year to investigate such
diseases as pneumonia, hepatitis, influenza,
nosocomial infections, catheter-related in-
fections, LaCrosse encephalitis, recurrent
respiratory papillomatosis, Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease, and infections due to van-
comycin-resistant enterococci, acyclovir-
resistant genital herpes, and respiratory
syncytial virus.
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PRIORITY 3:
Establish four population-based Emerging Infec-
tions Epidemiology and Prevention Centers to con-
duct focused epidemiology and prevention projects
emphasizing foodborne and waterborne infectious
diseases and diseases that are vaccine preventable.
Implementation:
1995 Created the Emerging Infections Programs
(EIPs) (see pages 17–18).
1995 Entered into EIP agreements with Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Oregon.
1996 Entered into an EIP agreement with Geor-
gia.
1996 Created the Foodborne Disease Active Sur-
veillance Network (FoodNet), in collabo-
ration with the EIP network, the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration, and the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, to monitor the
burden and determine the causes of
foodborne diseases in the United States (see
page 19).
1997 Entered into EIP agreements with New
York State and Maryland.
PRIORITY 4:
 Strengthen and link four existing sites for a global
consortium to promote the detection, monitoring,
and investigation of infections emerging interna-
tionally that could affect the health of Americans.
Implementation:
1994 Helped form the National Science and
Technology Council’s interagency Working
Group on Emerging and Re-emerging
Infectious Diseases, Committee on Interna-
tional  Science, Engineering and Technol-
ogy (CISET), chaired by the Director, CDC.
1995 Supported the development and passage of
the 1995 World Health Assembly resolu-
tion that formed the basis for the WHO
program on emerging diseases and led to
the establishment of the Division of Emerg-
ing and Other Communicable Diseases
Surveillance and Control (WHO/EMC).
1995 Assigned CDC staff to the WHO subre-
gional office in Harare, Zimbabwe, to
implement a program to improve prepared-
ness for, and response to, epidemic diar-
rheal diseases in southern Africa.
1995– Participated in interagency emerging infect-
1997 ious disease activities initiated under the
following bilateral and multilateral forums:
• The Asian-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC)
• The Common Agenda with Japan
• The U.S.-Russia Commission on
Economic and Technological
Cooperation
• The U.S.-South Africa Binational
Commission
• The Group of Eight Industrialized
Nations
• The Transatlantic Agenda with the
European Union
• U.S.-Mexico Binational Agreement
1996 Helped form the interagency CISET Emerg-
ing Infectious Disease Task Force (co-
chaired by CDC and the White House Of-
fice of Science and Technology Policy) to
implement the National Science and Tech-
nology Council report, Infectious Disease–
A Global Health Threat36 and the 1996
Presidential Decision Directive on Emerg-
ing Infectious Diseases.37
1996- Conducted an exchange of scientists with
1997 Vietnam and prepared a feasibility study
for establishing a field station there.
1996- Enhanced the CDC field stations in Kenya
1997 and Guatemala.
1996- Provided funds to enhance surveillance and
1997 response capacities at 23 WHO Collabo-
rating Centers based at CDC that address
emerging infectious disease issues covered
in this plan (see page 25).
1996– Strengthened global surveillance for influ-
1997 enza by increasing the number of influenza
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surveillance sites in China from 6 to 12,
training laboratorians from 14 countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and pro-
viding resources for enhanced influenza sur-
veillance in Russia.
1997 Assigned an epidemiologist to work at
the Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3
(NAMRU-3) in Cairo.
Goal II:  Applied Research
Integrate laboratory science and epidemiology to
optimize public health practice.
PRIORITY 1:
Reestablish an extramural research program to sup-
port emerging infectious disease prevention and
control activities, such as evaluating the role of pre-
scribing practices in the development of antimicro-
bial drug-resistant pathogens.
Implementation:
1996 Created extramural grant programs to sup-
port research on tickborne diseases and on
preventing the spread of antimicrobial re-
sistance.
1997 Created extramural grant programs to sup-
port research on heterosexual and house-
hold transmission of hepatitis C virus in-
fection; the development of diagnostics for
certain parasitic, bacterial, and sexually
transmitted diseases; and the development
of algorithms for the diagnosis and treat-
ment of diarrheal diseases. A contract was
established to evaluate the utility of human
papillomavirus testing in screening proto-
cols for cervical disease.
1996– Provided support for a variety of collabor-
1997 ative projects with academic institutions,
through cooperative agreements with the
Minority Health Professionals Foundation,
the Association of Schools of Public Health,
and the Association of Teachers of Preven-
tive Medicine. The projects included stud-
ies of bleeding disorders, respiratory ill-
nesses in day care, and enteric infections in
a rural minority community.
PRIORITY 2:
Assess the impact of food preparation guidelines
on the incidence of foodborne infections such as
E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella Enteritidis.
Implementation:
1996– Conducted surveys at FoodNet sites to
1997 assess factors related to ascertainment of
foodborne and waterborne illnesses. Ques-
tions under study included the following:
Which diagnostic tests are ordered for pa-
tients with enteric illnesses?  Which labo-
ratory tests are performed when a health-
care provider sends a stool sample to a clini-
cal laboratory?
1996– Conducted case-control studies of E. coli
1997 O157 and Salmonella infections at five
FoodNet sites to investigate the role of
food-handling practices and other behav-
ioral factors in the transmission of
foodborne diseases.
1997 Established a memorandum of understand-
ing with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
the U.S. Department of Education, and the
Partnership for Food Safety Education
(which includes representatives of the food
industry) to develop a program for public
education in food safety.
Goal III:  Prevention and Control
Enhance communication of public health information
about emerging diseases and ensure prompt implemen-
tation of prevention strategies.
Priority 1:
Develop additional means to deliver laboratory and
public health information on emerging infections
and antimicrobial resistance.
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Implementation:
1994 Established biweekly national teleconfer-
ences to share expertise on the prevention
and control of cryptosporidiosis outbreaks,
under the auspices of the CDC Working
Group on Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis.
1995 Created new outlets for the dissemination
of public health information, including
• A new scientific journal called Emerg-
ing Infectious Diseases.
• On-line dissemination of surveillance
data via the CDC Internet home page.
• Slide sets with technical notes on emerg-
ing infectious diseases for use by public
health professionals.
1995– Supported a series of forums on emerging
1997 infectious diseases conducted by the Insti-
tute of Medicine of the National Academy
of Sciences, as well as several other confer-
ences and scientific meetings on emerging
infections.
1995- Sponsored teleconferences for health
1997 professionals on such topics as hantavirus
pulmonary syndrome, E. coli O157, van-
comycin-resistant enterococci, and man-
agement of pneumococcal pneumonia.
1996 Developed a National Infectious Disease
Prevention Training Plan in conjunction
with the Association of State and Territo-
rial Directors of Health Promotion and
Public Education (ASTDHPPE).
1996- With the French agencies ORSTOM
1997 (Office de la Recherche Scientifique et
Technique Outre-mer) and CNRS (Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique), as
well as several other partners, CDC devel-
oped and sponsored the 1996 and 1997
International Workshops on Molecular
Epidemiology and Evolutionary Genetics
in Infectious Diseases.
1996– Implemented a wide range of health
1997 education projects, including an Internet-
based laboratory training program on drug-
resistant gonorrhea and a program to
educate pet owners about prevention of
reptile-associated salmonellosis. CDC also
created exhibits on dengue for a children’s
museum in Puerto Rico and conducted fo-
cus group research to develop a manual on
infectious disease prevention issues for care-
takers of older adults.
1997 Strengthened national education efforts on
hepatitis-related liver disease (with an ini-
tial emphasis on infection with hepatitis C
virus) by supporting efforts of private or-
ganizations, producing a teleconference,
and providing training and educational
materials.
1997 Created a public education campaign to
improve communication between the pub-
lic and physicians concerning Helicobacter
pylori and ulcers.
1997 Published The CAUSE: Careful Antibiotic
Use to Prevent Resistance, a newsletter for
clinicians, public health workers, and oth-
ers.
1997 Published Cryptosporidium and Water: A
Public Health Handbook and conducted a
teleconference on this topic for state and
local health authorities, water utility work-
ers, and others.
1997 Planned the International Conference on
Emerging Infectious Diseases, held in
Atlanta, Georgia, in March 1998.
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PRIORITY 2:
Develop and implement guidelines for the preven-
tion of opportunistic infections in immunosup-
pressed persons.
Implementation:
1995 Published Guidelines for the Prevention of
Opportunistic Infections in HIV-Infected
Persons by the U.S. Public Health Service
and the Infectious Diseases Society of
America. These guidelines were published
in CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report (MMWR) and other medical jour-
nals and newsletters, and are available on
the Internet.
1996 Initiated work on guidelines for the pre-
vention of opportunistic infections in bone
marrow transplant recipients.
1997 Updated the 1995 Guidelines for the Pre-
vention of Opportunistic Infections in HIV-
Infected Persons and published them in the
MMWR and other medical journals.
Goal IV:  Infrastructure and Training
Strengthen local, state, and federal public health infra-
structures to support surveillance and implement pre-
vention and control programs.
Priority 1:
Provide state-of-the-art training in diagnostic evalu-
ation and testing for medical laboratory personnel
to ensure the diagnosis and surveillance of emerg-
ing infections.
Implementation:
1995– Transferred rapid diagnostic techniques for
1996 diagnosis of hantavirus pulmonary syn-
drome and arboviral diseases (such as
LaCrosse encephalitis, St. Louis encephali-
tis, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis) to
state and local health departments.
1995- Supported projects to improve diagnostic
1997 capacity at state and major metropolitan
area health departments, through ELC
agreements, EIPs, and other cooperative
agreements. For example, funds were pro-
vided to eight states in 1996 and five states
in 1997 through ELC agreements to imple-
ment standardized DNA fingerprinting of
E. coli O157:H7 in state public health labo-
ratories.
1995- Supported intramural projects to improve
1997 diagnostic capacity at CDC’s National Cen-
ter for Infectious Diseases, providing
laboratorians with advanced training, and
purchasing state-of-the-art laboratory
equipment and computer tools.
1996 Supported 75 new full-time positions at the
National Center for Infectious Diseases,
including laboratory scientists and techni-
cians.
1996 Worked with the Pan American Health
Organization to provide training in the di-
agnosis of influenza, dengue, and dengue
hemorrhagic fever to support active surveil-
lance for these diseases in the Americas.
Priority 2:
Establish a public health laboratory fellowship in
infectious diseases that will train medical microbi-
ologists in public health approaches to diagnosis
and molecular epidemiology.
1995 Created the Emerging Infectious Diseases
Laboratory Fellowship Program through a
cooperative agreement with the Associa-
tion of Public Health Laboratories (APHL)
(see page 40). Of the 18 fellows who com-
pleted the program as of February 1998,
two entered Ph.D. degree programs, two
entered master’s degree programs, six ac-
cepted positions at CDC laboratories, five
accepted positions at state public health
laboratories, one accepted a position with
a clinical microbiology laboratory, and one
accepted a fellowship with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture.
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